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TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN

by

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JORN H. BRAUER

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W. Hague

Supervisor

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J Wright

External Examiner

Date. June 16

DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this work to the memory of Dr. Metro Gulutsan who exemplified in his scholarship and in his life the qualities revealed by the Good Samaritans in this study.

ABSTRACT

The nature of the Good Samaritan, one who helps another at some cost to himself, has received an increasing amount of attention from researchers in the last decade. The present research is a naturalistic study which uses a multidimensional approach and is based on the assumption that altruism does exist. An operational definition of altruism is used in identifying the ten individuals who comprise the sample. This study looks intently at these ten individuals and at their prosocial action in order to contribute to the understanding of prosocial behavior. The effects of internal and external antecedents on prosocial behavior are investigated, and an assessment made of their relative influence and interaction. The internal antecedents included: the effect of societal values; the cultural conditions; the influence of perceived norms; the influence of parental modelling and nurturance; the personality traits; and the subject's level of moral reasoning. The external antecedents included the subjects' decision-making processes, effects of the presence and behavior of bystanders, the considered expertise of the subjects and the characteristics of the person needing assistance.

Analysis of the interview data found that internal antecedents influenced the prosocial action to a greater extent than did situational variables. Family influences on the subjects were reported but these were not necessarily in the direct way that the literature predicted, i.e. that altruism is a result of a nurturing family or parental modelling.

The subjects brought with them to the situation personality traits of harmavoidance, order, achievement, endurance, autonomy, dominance, nurturance, a sense of confidence; and conventional moral reasoning including a focus on the societal perspective and an individual's right to live. Role taking, empathy, and compassion were mediating factors in the subjects' prosocial behavior. The subjects followed a sequence of steps in their intervention and in the process were not influenced by the presence of bystanders or the characteristics of the person needing assistance.

This thesis raises some specific questions for further research, not only regarding the nature of the Good Samaritan but the nature of the non-acting bystander as well. More naturalistic studies which would permit value generalizations to be made about prosocial behavior and the Good Samaritan personality, are seen as necessary.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I INTRODUCTION 1

The Approach to the Study 4

Theoretical Considerations 4

Methodological Considerations 6

Purpose of the Study 7

The Need for the Study 9

Definition of Terms 9

Assumptions of the Study 10

Deliminations of the Study 10

Organization of the Study 11

II REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 13

Altruism - Methodological Problems and Theoretical Considerations 13

What is Altruism? 13

Altruism: Motivation and Behavior 15

Theoretical Attempts to Account for Altruism 16

Research Design of Studies on Altruism . . . 21

Variables Related to Altruism 23

Internal Variables 24

Societal and Cultural Norms 24

Modelling and Identification 25

Parental Nurturance 29

Personality Characteristics 29

Moral Development 34

Piaget's Theory of Moral Development 36

Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development . . . 40

CHAPTER PAGE

Situation Variables 48
  Decision-making process 49
  The Presence of Bystanders 50
  Characteristics of the Beneficiary 53
Summary 55

III THE METHOD, THE SUBJECTS, AND THE SITUATIONS . . 58
  Naturalistic Study 58
Descriptive Survey 58
Observation Phase 61
  The Interview 61
  Personality Research Form 65
  Written Reports. 67
Bias Potential in the Research Design 68
Nature and Establishment of the Sample 72
The Situations 75
Research Questions 81
Presentation of the Data 82
Guidelines for the Study 82
Summary 83

IV FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 84
Internal Variables 85
  Item I 85
  Item II 85
  Item III 93
  Item IV 112
  Item V 113
Situational Variables 117
  Item VI 118
  Item VII 124
  Item VIII 126
  Item IX 130

CHAPTER PAGE

V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 134

Summary Discussion 134

The Need 134

The Design and Methodology 134

Limitations 135

Findings Related to Internal Variables . . . 136

Findings Related to Situational Variables . . 139

Concluding Comments 143

Suggestions for Further Research 150

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 151

APPENDIX 165

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

I Kohlberg's Six Moral Stages 42

II Personality Research Form Scales 66

III Age Distribution of Subuects 74

IV Subject Distribution on Personality Trait Continua 94

V Category A 96

VI Category B 99

VII Category C 102

VIII Category D 104

IX Category E 105

X Category F 108

XI Group Trends on Personality Trait Continua . 111

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

I Process of Bystanders Experience. 132

II Interaction of Antecedent of Prosocial Behavior 145

A man was going from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down that road; and when he saw him he passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was; and when he saw him he had compassion, and went to him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and brought him next to an inn, and took care of him. And the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper; saying, "Take care of him; and whatever you spend, I will repay you when I come back"

(Luke 10:29-37).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The biblical parable of the Good Samaritan is a study in contrasts; The Samaritan with the Priest and Levite, the man who helped with those who simply "passed by". What kind of persons stop to help, even when the potential loss or risk to themselves is great? What are the characteristics of the persons who display this prosocial behavior? It is with the purpose of shedding some light on what is involved in acting prosocially, that the present study uses the tools of contemporary psychology to help answer the question: "What kind of an individual will help another in distress?".

The research into characteristics of witnesses who intervene in emergencies and demonstrate prosocial behavior has been actively pursued in the last decade. A large, but rather diffuse body of information has resulted. This recent research activity has been stimulated by an ever increasing requirement for an awareness of moral qualities and a need for prosocial behavior on the part of all of us. A major concern today is the apparent deterioration in the willingness of individuals to help their fellow man and to come to his aid in a dangerous situation.

Incidents that have attracted our attention are numerous, particularly in the last ten years. Rosenthal (1964) reports the Kitty Genovese story where thirty-eight witnesses to her murder did not assist by intervening or calling for help. The Poughkeepsie Journal (1971) reported the kidnapping of a ten year old girl, her subsequent escape along a busy highway, the refusal of hundreds of motorists to stop, and her resultant recapture and final murder. The New York Times (Sept. 21, 1972) editorialized with regard to a mugging and slaying:

> ...for some time passersby stared and went on their way before any fellow human being had the decency to call the police. Creatures of the jungle could not be more unfeeling.

Public unwillingness to act is also attested to by other news reports:

> Bystanders ignored raped girl's screams
> (Edmonton Journal, August 1973).
>
> Thirty sit and watch as man beaten
> (Edmonton Journal, September 1973).
>
> He lay dying in water and passersby watched
> (Edmonton Journal, September 1973).

Reports of this nature could result in the assumption that bystanders were apathetic, uncaring or egocentric. It may give credence to the term "homo urbanis" which sees man showing no compassion, relating to others as objects, losing his capacity for empathy and consequently rejecting the traditional moral imperative of helping others in difficulty or distress.

The evidence, however, needs closer scrutiny. In most reported cases, it seems that bystanders do not simply turn away but are instead caught, fascinated, and at odds with themselves, yet unable to act or able to turn away and go about their business. Latane and Darley (1970) report that the behavior of the witnesses, as reported in the Genovese case, is also typical in other types of emergencies; car accidents, fires, drownings and attempted suicides. Most of these incidents report numerous bystanders inactive and apparently fascinated, yet the research to date does not identify specific antecedents that correlate with this lack of intervention. There is no indication that the inactive bystander did not feel compassion or empathy for the person in distress. Similarly, in the Good Samaritan parable, we do not know whether or not those that passed by felt compassion. It may well be that other variables intervened, and that feelings of compassion were not acted upon. The parable suggests that compassion motivated the altruistic behavior of the Samaritan. The literature, however, indicates that compassion is only one of the possible motivators.

Aronfreed (1968) considered empathy an essential component of altruism, but the generally accepted definitions of altruism are operational, typically excluding the motivation of external rewards but allowing for a variety of motivators such as compassion, anger, guilt, love, or compensation. Prosocial behavior refers to actions that are voluntary and intended to aid or benefit another person or group of people without the anticipation of external reward. Such actions often entail some cost, self-sacrifice or risk on the part of the actor. The behavior encompassed by the above definition includes generosity, altruism, compassion, sympathy, helping people in distress by giving material or psychological assistance, sharing, donating, and participating in activities designed to improve the general welfare by reducing social injustices and inequalities. Empathy, role taking, and compassion are considered to be mediating factors in prosocial action. Empathy according to Hoffman (1976) "refers to the involuntary, at times forceful, experiencing of another person's emotional state" (p. 126). Role taking on the other hand, may be similar to empathy but includes the cognitive component as well. Role taking involves taking the attitudes of others, becoming aware of their thoughts and feelings, and putting oneself in their place. Compassion may well be a synthesis of empathy and role taking. To realize that another person is in distress and is experiencing that distress, transforms the empathy with the victim, a parallel affective response, into compassion for the victim, a more reciprocal response. The development of empathy, role taking and compassion is not independent of an individual's cognitive and affective development. Prosocial behavior is a function of complex interactions of motivations and individual and situational variables. Since encounters with another in distress often involve conflict between the needs of the helper and the victim, prior experiences with the environment and others must play an important role in the development of altruistic behavior.

> ...Socialization can also foster personality characteristics which may be important in certain situations in converting a disposition to help into action....Future research has the vital task of determining the combinations of experiences that will develop a person who both feels compassion for his fellow human beings and acts upon it.(Hoffman, 1976, p. 143)

The Approach of the Study

Theoretical considerations

Different theorists and observers can agree about terms used to describe certain events and behavior, but disagree in their conceptual analyses of why they are occurring as they are. The propositions they develop are to account for the causal (functional) inter-relationships of the events that occur. The research for a deeper understanding of the acquisition and development of prosocial behavior can be guided by major theories such as psychoanalytic, social learning or cognitive developmental, as well as speculations and minitheories concerned with critical issues and variables not included in the major developmental theories. However, none of the theories can adequately handle all facets of prosocial development. The current understanding of the phenomena of altruism has benefitted from the fact that the major theories have each focused on different aspects of the phenomenon, which the other theories underplayed or neglected. Psychoanalytic theory has centered on the critical role of emotion and guilt, early child-parent relationships and identification in the development of altruistic behavior. Social learning theory maintains that most human behavior is learned and the development of overt responses is effected by the environment, especially rewards, punishment and modeling. Cognitive developmental theory focuses on the interaction of the changing mental structures (stages) with environmental events and underscores the significance of reasoning and role taking. In order to gain some insights into what governs the behavior of prosocial actions one must identify some influential antecedents; be they neurological, physiological, cognitive, emotional, social, behavioral or situational.

This study attempts to achieve a broader understanding of prosocial behavior by examining antecedents which may be the emphasis in any one or all of the major theories. Although the focus of the major theories is different, four generally agreed upon categories of antecedents or prosocial behavior have emerged. These include: group membership, socialization experiences, cognitive functions, and situational variables.

Methodological considerations

Researchers into altruism have struggled with inadequate theoretical explanations, multiple definitions and lack of consensus on techniques of measurement. The nature of research to date is largely experimental, although more naturalistic studies are now emerging. "Naturalistic observation takes a great deal of time and effort, but ...it is likely to provide a highly dependable and accurate estimate of the (subjects) propensities to behave prosocially" (Mussen Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, p. 18). Refinements, elaborations, changes and developments are inevitable and necessary to overcome these methodological problems.

Eysenck (1976) feels that when dealing with altruistic or prosocial behavior we must ask the right question.

> It is pointless to ask why people behave in a selfish, aggressive, immoral manner; such behavior is clearly reinforcing in that it gives the person or organism acting in such a fashion immediate satisfaction....The proper question is rather the opposite one: How does it come about that people (and animals) do not always act in an immoral, antisocial, or asocial manner? How can we account for 'good' behavior, that is, behavior which at first sight at least goes counter to the interests of the person concerned? (p. 108)

As well as describing incidents in which people did not react, the literature also reports situations in which people did respond and includes reasons, given in retrospect, for their behavior. Researchers have attempted to determine significant antecedents of the intervening or non-intervening behavior. From the research discussed in subsequent chapters, there emerges a profile of prosocial behavior and characteristics of the Good Semaritans studied.

Purpose of the Study

This is a naturalistic and descriptive study which investigates ten individuals who at grave personal risk intervened in an emergency situation to save the life of another.

The intent of the study is to elicit some new understanding of individuals who have acted prosocially and to add to the present profile of the Good Samaritan. The behavior and motivation of the individuals who act prosocially begins to make more sense when we understand more about them. Although no pretense is made to investigate all aspects of altruistic behavior in this study, the intention is to add to, substantiate and question the parts of the profile currently available. Two categories of possible antecedents (internal and external) and the interaction between the categories were examined to determine the role they played in the behavior demonstrated.

It is hoped by studying individuals, who have displayed prosocial behavior, relevant antecedents of their behavior may be identified, and the phenomena of altruism better understood. By inquiring into the characteristics of these individuals who have distinguished themselves by their actions, some information will be gleaned as to the qualities of persons to be cultivated and nurtured in order to encourage other displays of altruistic behavior.

In attempting to understand what influences prosocial behavior, this study investigated certain internal antecedents. These included the effect of societal values, cultural traditions, and whether the subjects perceived their actions to be normative; the influence of parental modeling and nurturance; common personality traits or a personality profile typifying the subjects; and the subjects' level of moral reasoning.

The settings of the subjects' actions were examined in an attempt to elucidate any relevant situational variables. These variables are external to the subjects and of a temporary nature. The study attempted to determine if the subjects' behavior was affected by the presence or behavior of other bystanders; how competent the subjects felt in carrying out their intervention; whether their behavior was affected by the characteristics of the person needing assistance; and finally an examination of the subjects' decision-making processes prior to and during intervention.

The researcher, in investigating the phenomena, conducted an unstructured interview, a structured interview (Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview Form A, 1976) and administered a questionnaire (The Personality Research Form, Jackson, 1967). The intent was, as Murray (1941) suggested, that the observation of the parts would lead to a synthetic conception of the whole and this holistic perspective would provide the framework for understanding and reinterpreting the role and interaction of the parts.

The Need for the Study

The possession of a scheme or profile within which the development of prosocial behavior is encouraged may not suffice as a basis for intervention. However, any attempt to correct a problem must logically derive from further analysis. Thus, one must not only be able to recognize and satisfactorily identify the behavior, but one must know how it is that it works; in other words what it is that makes the individual, who displays prosocial behavior, function. A way of representing and classifying, in a comprehensive fashion, the multifaceted realm of prosocial behavior and development is imperative.

Definition of Terms

Good Samaritan - an individual (intervenor) who, under conditions of personal threat, comes to the aid of someone in difficulty.

Prosocial Behavior - a purposive action to aid or benefit another without anticipation of an external reward and often at some cost or risk to the actor.

Altruistic Act - behavior which is emitted voluntarily, and is carried out to benefit another, without anticipation of external rewards.

Role Taking - the ability to see and evaluate a situation from the perspective of other.

Moral Levels - there are three levels (Kohlberg, 1969) indicating different relationships between the self and society's rules and expectations. Level 1 is preconventional; level 11 is conventional; level 111 is postconventional. The levels are defined in terms of (1) what is right; (2) the reason for upholding the right, and (3) the underlying social perspective.

Moral Reasoning - modes of thought underlying moral responses. The reasons, justifications and criteria used in choosing one principle, policy or course of action over others.

Personality Profile - a set of scores for personality traits or factors which are broadly relevant to the functioning of the individual in a wide variety of situations (Jackson, 1967).

Assumptions of the Study

It was assumed that altruism exists and that people perform altruistic acts for reasons.

The sample population, to which the subjects from this study belong, was defined by the awarding agencies rather than by the researcher. It was assumed, in their selection procedure, that they carefully and deliberately applied their outlined criteria to the individuals nominated for recognition.

Secondly, it was assumed that the personal unstructured interview techniques used, which allowed the researcher to probe, clarify and assist the subjects in retrospection, would provide accurate and valid data befitting the purpose of this study.

Deliminations of the Study

Although the awarding agencies that recognized the subjects in this sample give three categories of awards, it was decided to consider only persons who had received the Gold or the Silver award as potential subjects for this study. Recipients of the third level award were not included in the sample population because they were: a) people who acted "on the job" or had been trained specifically for that type of intervention, i.e. members of the police force, fire fighters, medics, or b) people who intervened when the risk to themselves was not great or the potential cost of the intervention was relatively small.

Secondly, because of the possible difficulty of locating individuals who had received the awards many years ago, only recent (since 1977) recipients were considered.

Thirdly, the sample included only award recipients living in Alberta.

Organization of the Study

Chapter 1 describes the intent of the study and outlines the nature and significance of the phenomena considered. It indicates the focus of the research, defines the terms and describes the underlying assumptions and delimitations.

Chapter 11 provides a survey of the literature relating to the theories of and research into prosocial behavior.

Chapter 111 describes the research design and methodology adapted. It defines the sample and the means by which the subjects were selected. It briefly outlines the situations in which the subjects participated and itemizes the research questions which provided the focus for the study. It delineates the procedure involved in collecting the research data, describes the instruments used and outlines the way in which the data is presented and analyzed.

Chapter IV reports and discusses the findings of the study.

Chapter V provides a study summary and discusses the implications of the research.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter presents a review and critical analysis of studies conducted on altruistic and prosocial behavior. It examines ways in which altruism is defined, ways theories account for the behavior and the various methodologies used to investigate the phenomenon. Emphasis will be placed on the efforts of researchers who have attempted to identify characteristics of individuals or to establish some common antecedents of altruistic behavior. Internal and external variables and the interaction of the two will be examined to determine their relative influence on prosocial behavior according to the studies described.

Altruism - Methodological Problems and Theoretical Consideration

What is altruism?

Inquiry into the nature of altruism has revealed a number of ways that investigators have conceptualized and specified the phenomena.

Researchers concerned with the antecedents of altruistic behavior ask the question "What determines in a particular situation whether or not one person helps another in distress?" The question implies a very broad definition of altruism - behavior which benefits another in need, regardless of the helper's motives. Aronfreed (1968) narrows this conception considerably by regarding empathy as an essential component and considering behavior controlled by expectations of increased self-esteem to be non-altruistic.

Macaulay & Berkowitz (1970) prefer to define altruism as behavior carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources. This is similar to Rosenhan's (1970) "socially autonomous altruism" and Leed's (1963) definition which specifies three criteria of an altruistic act; an end in itself and not directed at gain, emitted voluntarily, and does good. Heider (1958) defined the determinant of gratitude (gratitude as a result of an altruistic act) as follows:

> We do not feel grateful to a person who helps us fortuitously or because he was forced to do so, or because he was obliged to do so. Gratitude is determined by the will, the intention of the benefactor.(p. 265)

In support of Heider (1958) and Leeds (1963) definitions, Tesser, Gatewood & Driver (1968) found that undergraduates felt more positive toward potential benefactors, when their help was intentional, valuable and cost the benefactor a great deal. Goranson & Berkowitz (1966); Frisch & Greenberg (1968); Lerner & Lichtman (1968); Hornstein, Fisch & Holmes (1968); found that help was liable to be reciprocated when it was perceived as voluntary and intentional. Brehm & Cole (1966); Kiesler (1966) and Schopler & Thompson (1968) demonstrated, inappropriate favors (namely favors with doubtful motives) elicited less help from receivers than did favors considered to be legitimately altruistic.

In lieu of a single and precise definition of altruistic behavior, social scientists have opted for an operational definition that relies on the everyday or layman's conception.

> It must be realized, though, that whatever errors the layman may make in his attribution of altruism in specific situations, the 'category' of altruism is what he thinks it is... it is the 'layman's' definition that determines his reactions (Krebs, 1969, p. 364).

The operational definition includes perceptions that the behavior benefits another, was emitted voluntarily and intentionally, and without anticipation of external reward. It is such an operational definition that was used to identify the subjects'behavior in this study as altruistic.

Assessment of altruistic behavior is also a matter of concern. Some investigators have defined altruism according to the ratings of others (Turner, 1962; Friedrichs, 1960; Sawyer, 1966), some have used test scores (self-rating measures) and some used behavioral measures (Latane & Darley, 1968; London, 1970).

Altruism: motivation and behavior

The assumption behind the behavioral research is that the observed behavior that was perceived as altruistic and the motivation behind it are congruent. The validity of this judgment is also the concern of investigators. Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1964) maintain that it is more important to consider the intention or reasoning behind the act, than to consider the act or its consequences, however one cannot be altruistic by merely intending, there must be an act. There are a variety of terms used in the literature; prosocial behavior (Bandura & Walters, 1963), helping behavior (Berkowitz, 1967), volunteering (Rosenbaum, 1956), bystander intervention (Latane & Darley, 1970), and all imply altruistic, other directed behavior, but do not necessarily establish it. Researchers, however, seem generally content to accept the operational definition of altruism and to focus their inquiry on an examination of the antecedents of the behavior.

Theoretical attempts to account for altruism

Altruistic behavior poses a challenge to many of the influential theories.

> It is characteristic of anything really complex about the human condition that it offers a severe test of both the power and breadth of a psychological theory.(Aronfreed, 1976, p. 54)

The current understanding of altruistic behavior has benefitted from the differing foci found in studies undertaken to support the various theoretical positions.

Genetic psychology has tried to link behavior to genetic and hereditary influences. Much of the research in this area has been directed at establishing the existence of altruism in infrahuman forms and linking this to the group or kin survival instinct. Animals have been observed to donate, share, rescue and self-sacrfice, but the evidence that this parallels similar human behavior or that human altruism is under direct genetic control, has not been forthcoming. As a result, a genetic explanation for human altruism is not widely accepted, but rather as Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg (1977), summarize:

> We concur with the view shared by most behavioral scientists: what humankind inherits is the potential or possibility of learning a wide variety of social behaviors. But what is actually learned depends on the social situation....Social evolution is based on psychological and social mechanisms rather than genetic ones.(p. 45)

In the psychoanalytic tradition Glover (1925), Freud (1937), and Fenishel (1945), theorized that the dynamics of guilt and self-destruction and identity conflicts could be called upon to account for altruistic behavior. In the psychoanalytic theory there are three major structures, the "id", the "ego", and the "superego".

The "id" is unconscious and contains the instincts and repressed experiences. The "ego" is the executive of the personality; it tries to satisfy the instincts by appropriate interactions with the external world. The "superego" is a persons conscience, which develops as a result of social training. Through identification, the child incorporates and internalizes some of the parent's or other model's behavior, personality traits, moral standards and values. According to this theory, human behavior is impelled largely by self-gratification. Instinctual drives and guilt are considered major determinants of social conscience and moral actions. This emphasis on the "id" in explaining altruistic and other adaptive undefensive behaviors encountered difficulties (Maddi , 1968), and as a result, other theorists tended to stress adaptations of the ego (Murray, 1938; Erikson, 1950; Breger, 1973). They rejected the notion that moral behavior and values simply represent the early internalization of parental and societal values, but instead regard the process of identification and development as ongoing. Despite the psychoanalytic emphasis on the self-seeking aspects of human behavior, and its difficulty with the development of altruistic predispositions, the theory has contributed to a better understanding of the many factors of prosocial orientation (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977). Particularly, it has sensitized behavioral scientists to some possible antecedents of prosocial behavior, such as the effects of early childhood training and the role of identification of modeling.

Altruistic behavior is also a problem for the theories of psychology which are based on the assumption that man acts in order to be rewarded and to avoid punishment. Prosocial intervention often involves an obvious potential for loss to the intervenor rather than a reward, and yet people do help others at very real and grave risk to themselves.

Social learning theorists accommodate altruism in a number of ways, while maintaining that human behavior is learned and modified by environmental events. They contend that the development of moral standards and prosocial behavior is influenced by rewards, punishment and modelling, even though they are not always obvious. It is evident that children learn a great deal by observation and by imitation of a model's behavior without direct reinforcement. It is suggested that the reinforcers may be subtle or that previous reinforcement may have so firmly established the behavior that removing the reinforcer has no effect on the continuation of the behavior. It contends that a child that has been praised for sharing or helping will often display this behavior, even when the praise is no longer present from an external agent. The praise has apparently been internalized and replaced by self-praise (Aronfreed, 1968; Goldiamond, 1968). The long term effect of the environment "acting on" the individual creates a behavioral predisposition. The fact that the existence of a predisposition to behave prosocially does not result in consistant displays of behavior, has led to the contention that:

> Human beings not only generate behaviors but also categorize, evaluate and judge them (Mischel & Mischel, 1976, p. 84).

Mischel and Grusec (1966) and Bandura (1971) believe that each individual acquires the capacity to construct a great range of potential behaviors, moral, immoral and amoral; and different individuals construct behavior patterns in different ways.

> ...expectancies tend to become relatively specific, rather than broadly generalized. Although a person's expectancies (and hence performance) tend to be highly discriminative, there certainly is some generalization, but their patterning in the individual tends to be idiosyncratically organized.(Mischel and Mischel, 1976, p. 105)

This acceptance that individuals "act on" the environment and are active participants is fundamental to cognitive developmental theory. Each individual is seen as perceiving his environment in his own intelligent way and receiving and interpreting stimuli in a personal, meaningful manner.

Cognitive developmental theorists have examined altruistic behavior from the perspective of stage or level of reasoning (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969). The stages are seen as integrated wholes that are qualitatively different and through a process of assimilation and integration people can move from one stage to the next. Proponents of cognitive development theory have been more concerned with moral thought as they define and measure it, than with moral behavior. Kohlberg and Piaget recognize that moral reasoning or thought does not necessarily predict or correspond with the appropriate action. Simpson (1976) places a high emphasis on the complexity of the interaction between emotional and intellectual growth as affect, cognition and behavior are not linked in a specific or uniform manner. Kohlberg (1909), Erikson (1968) and Maslow (1954) propose universal cognitive structures which imply that individuals who remain motivated by unfulfilled psychological needs may not be able to function at higher levels.

A humanistic approach is represented by Abraham Maslow (1954, 1962) who emphasizes a hierarchy of needs which, in many ways, parallels Kohlberg's moral reasoning typology and culminates in the need for self-actualization. Maslow was emphatic in pointing out that "self actualization", as he used the term, is not a self-centred, egoistic actualization of one's potentials without any guidelines. Self-actualization must of necessity include concern for others, since the self is found only in relationship to others. Ultimately, values must direct the satisfaction of needs, and among these values, empathy, compassion, and a sense of human solidarity stand out. In this humanistic tradition any true growthful relationship with another person must be, not an "I - it" relationship, but an "I - thou" relationship, based on genuine concern and care.

In the higher order of the Judeo-Christian moral tradition it is the parable of the Good Samaritan, (Luke 10:24-37) which represents a model for social psychologists and researchers studying bystander intervention or prosocial behavior. It is possible that the altruistic behavior on the part of the Good Samaritan may go beyond the present confines of personality theory and may also go outside the theoretical dimensions of individual psychological theories. The extremely complex relations among diverse aspects of prosocial behavior within the same person, and the interaction between behavior and psychological condition prevent global generalizations about the nature and specific motivation underlying prosocial behavior.

None of the theories, considered alone, can account for the altruistic behavior reported in the literature, but each perspective has generated a great deal of relevant research.

> Positions which seemed to pose challenges to the existence of altruism have come to accept the fact that altruistic behavior occurs...and have set out to explain it.(Krebs, 1970, p. 262)

As a result,the study of altruism has benefitted from the plurality of theoretical orientations underlying the recent research.

Research design of studies on altruism

Several research designs are common in the investigation of altruism. One approach is to investigate hypothetical situations in which the researcher is interested in how persons "think" they would respond to situations in which their help is solicited and the reasoning behind their hypothetical actions. Critics of this approach (Mischel & Mischel, 1976; Burton, 1976) point out that there is little research to link moral reasoning with moral behavior. People do not always behave in ways which are consistant with their stated principles.

A second approach is to study actual behavior in a variety of settings; field studies of real occurrences, field studies of a staged experimental nature and laboratory simulation studies. Field study research of actual happenings has included a number of different samples: London (1970) investigated the rescuers of Jews in Nazi Germany, Rosenhan (1970) looked at civil rights workers, Schwartz (1970) the donors of bone marrow, and Fellner & Marshall (1970) the donors of kidneys for transplant.

Simulated field experiences deal with a collapsed subway rider (Piliavin, Rodin & Piliavin, 1969; Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972), a person lying in the doorway moaning and groaning (Darley & Batson, 1973) and lost children requiring assistance (Tokoshian, Haber and Lucido, 1977).

The laboratory has the advantage of providing the experimenter with a far greater degree of control over the independent variables. Laboratory simulation studies have faced the bystander with a great variety of staged disturbing experiences which called for many varied emergency interventions; physical assaults (Borofsky, Stollak & Messe, 1971), overhearing a violent fight between children (Latane & Darley, 1970), a seizure victim (Darley & Latane, 1968; Schwartz & Clausen, 1970), epileptic seizures (Darley & Latane, 1968; Horowitz, 1971), a loud crash in an adjoining room (Darley & Teger, 1973; Staub, 1970a, 1970b, 1971a, 1971b), ladder accidents (Bickman, 1971, 1972; Clark & Word, 1972), an asthmatic attack (Korte, 1971), and administration of an electric shock (Clark & Word, 1974; Kaufman, 1968).

One should use caution in generalizing the findings of simulated experiments in the field or in the laboratory to real life situations. It is questionable whether these experiments are representative of actual emergencies. For one reason, most of the laboratory research has been conducted in college and university laboratories and generally the experimental population has been drawn from these institutions. Secondly, a laboratory often provides a more familiar setting and is perceived as a potentially safer environment than a similar naturally occurring encounter.

> ...laboratory experiments often have an 'as if' quality about them. If subjects know that they are participating in an experiment, they may not react to what they see, but to what they think the experiment is about....Self-conscious and apprehensive about being evaluated, laboratory subjects may make an unusual attempt to behave normatively.(Latane & Darley, 1970, p. 7)

Variables Related to Altruism

Inquiry into the nature of altruism is shaped by many intricate and inter-related variables. The domain of the behavior is exceedingly complex. So many diverse variables have been studied that it isn't possible to examine them all and it is difficult to arrive at an encompassing perspective.

The independent variables of altruism can generally be divided into two categories: those characteristics that are external to the actor (the displayer of altruistic behavior) and often termed "situational" and those that are internal and include personality traits, socialization experiences, societal norms and level of cognitive development. These variables are not independent of each other and interact in complex ways, making their isolation difficult in the research that is conducted. The relative contribution of individual variables is difficult to ascertain. An attempt has, however, been made to clarify the scope of the study by investigating the correlates of apparent altruism as they have been reported in the literature. This area of research has received considerable attention, but despite this effort, results are often ambiguous or contradictory.

Internal Variables

Societal and cultural norms

One of the oldest expressions found in the Bible (Ecclesiastes 4:9-12) is that men need to live in the company of others to lead meaningful lives. The structure of societies rests on the success of maintaining the three-fold bond of succor, warmth and mutual defense. Although cultures can maintain themselves only if members show some concern for each other, there is great variety in the emphasis given this value. The culture in which a child is raised has an effect on his display of prosocial behavior, but it is not easy to determine "what" in the culture is responsible for the resultant behavior. A synthesis of the research results in this area indicates some tentative generalizations. Altruistic behavior is more often observed in cultures characterized by 1) stress on group orientation (Bronfenbrenner, 1970); 2) simple social organization or a rural setting (Marin, Mejia & DeOberle, 1975; Miller & Thomas, 1972); 3) assignment to women of important economic function (Whiting & Whiting, 1975); 4) extended family groupings (Whiting & Whiting, 1975); 5) expectation of children's acceptance of tasks or responsibility (Whiting & Whiting, 1975; Bronfenbrenner, 1970).

Modelling and Identification

Within any culture more data may be obtained by examining practices of recognized socialization agents, such as family members, peers, teachers, church authorities. These may account for the variations of prosocial orientation within cultures. Parents are generally the most significant agents of early socialization and thought to affect children's behavioral predispositions by their behavior as a model, their provision of a nurturing environment, their technique of discipline and numerous other dimensions within the family unit.

Studies attempting to correlate child rearing practices and children's prosocial tendencies have used a variety of approaches and research methods making it difficult to summarize their findings. Generally, however, the majority of the studies deal with modelling and identification as very important variables. The effects of these variables are interrelated with the effects of nurturance as a second variable.

Investigators of modelling and identification have approached the problem in two ways. One method used assesses behavior in a naturalistic manner by observing families function, interviewing parents, children, or both, and/or administering questionnaires or tests to family members. A second method is carried out in the laboratory in which family interactions can be reproduced and manipulated.

Evidence from the laboratory studies suggests that good modelling and encouragement on the part of family members results in altruistic behavior (Whiting & Whiting, 1975; Bandura, 1965; Grusec & Mischel, 1966; Yarrow, Scott & Waxler, 1973). Such experiments provide information on imitative behavior, but there is a lack of adequate evidence to suggest that results can be transferred to more naturalistic settings.

According to Bandura & Walters (1963) the observation of models affects behavior in two distinct ways; firstly by inducing the acquisition of long term behavioral disposition, and secondly by inducing the performance of imitative behavior. The way in which parents correspond to models and modelling effects are thought to lead to long range personality change and are referred to as behavioral dispositions. Performance, however, refers to the behavior which is specific to that situation and occurs because of the induction of temporary states.

Two criteria have to be met before conclusions can be drawn about the acquisition of behavioral dispositions; the behavior has to be generalizable to situations other than the one in question, and the behavior should be lasting. Most of the studies dealing with modelling fail to meet these criteria of internalization.

Studies on modelling tend to support the contention that prosocial behavior by a model is likely to alter the children's behavior in a similar direction. Just how this occurs is not clear. It has, however, been suggested (Krebs, 1969) that it is effected because models draw attention to possible courses of action and increase the salience of the social norms (Bryan & Test, 1967). They display examples of behavior that are appropriate in various situations (Rosenhan & White, 1967), and they supply information about the possible consequences of actions (Midlarsky & Bryan, 1967; Hornsteen et al, 1968).

Studies assessing the durability and generalizability of the effects of prosocial modelling have yielded some interesting results. Rosenhan (1969) had six to ten year old participants in one study observing a model donating liberally and they could rehearse prosocial behavior voluntarily. The positive effects of this modelling lasted for seven days and generalized in another quite different situation three weeks later. Further studies (Rushton, 1975; Rice and Grusec,1975), show that watching a model's generosity had lasting effects detectible two to four months later. Children donating chips anonymously, after watching a positive model, maintained that prosocial behavior ten days later (Midlarsky & Bryan, 1975). Months after observing a model's generosity, Rushton (1975) found that the experimental groups donated significantly greater amounts than did the control group, and demonstrated over time and across situations significant prosocial behavior. Rushton (1976) after surveying the literature on modelling concluded:

> ...It would appear that relatively brief exposure to highly salient models can produce desirable and generalizable behavior change in observers. Thus, there is reason to believe that modelling studies are analogous to the processes that occur in the natural environment. (p. 913)

Yarow and Scott (1973) discovered that the ideal situation for developing prosocial or altruistic behavior require that adults:

> ...manifest altruism at every level in principle and in practice, both toward the child and toward others in distress. (p. 251)...only when extensive training was conducted in the context of the developed nurturant interaction, was altruistic behavior significantly increased. (p. 253)

Naturalistic studies have investigated the effect of family models over a longer period of time than was generally the case in experimental studies. Studies by London (1970) and Rosenhan (1969) investigated adults who had shown unusual prosocial behavior. The methods for gathering data relied primarily on interviews and questionnaires. London (1970) interviewed twenty-seven Christians who had risked their lives to save Jews during the Second World War and found three predominant qualities among the subjects: a spirit of adventurousness; a sense of being socially marginal; and a high degree of identification with a parent model. London concluded that having a parent who serves as a moralistic model for identification was a powerful determinant of later prosocial, high risk behavior.

Two types of civil rights workers in the 1950's; those who were fully committed and active at some considerable deprecation to themselves, and those who limit their activities to involvement which did not require sacrifice of other pursuits, were interviewed by Rosenhan (1969). The findings indicated that parents who provided only symbolic models, but did not necessarily display prosocial behavior, had children who also became only partially committed and not as completely involved. The fully committed activists found their parents to not only preach, but also practice, altruism and reported maintaining a positive, warm and respecting relationship with their parents.

Parental nurturance

Nurturance can be defined by a wide range of behaviors which can be labelled as being warm, interested, responsive, help providing, comforting, attention giving, sympathetic, kind, affectionate and considerate.

The evidence regarding the influences of adult nurturance on children's prosocial behavior is inconsistent and inconclusive. Rutherford & Mussen (1968) found that generous nursery school boys perceived their fathers as more nurturant than did less generous boys. Similar conclusions about considerate behavior in children were made through studies by Murphy (1937), Staub (1971c), and Yarrow, Scott & Waxler (1973). Investigations by Allensmith (1960), Bandura (1965), and Sear, Maccobey & Lewin (1957) of relationships between parents (model) and child, which were typically warm, nurturant and relatively non-punitive, led to the findings that a prior positive relationship is conducive to altruistic behavior. Inconclusive or contrary results were reported by Rosenhan & White (1967), Hoffman & Saltzstein (1967), Grusec & Skubiski (1970) and Hoffman (1975).

There is some evidence that a nurturing environment may augment the modelling of prosocial behavior, but is not a sufficient condition to predict the development of that prosocial behavior.

Personality characteristics

Researchers have attempted to link specific personality traits to prosocial dispositions or behavior (Friedrichs, 1960; Sawyer, 1966;

Midlarsky, 1968; Staub, 1970; Yarrow, Scott & Waxler, 1973). There is a lack of consensus amongst these studies and they allow for only tentative conclusions.

There is some support for describing those persons considered high in prosocial behavior as assertive and outgoing. Rutherford & Mussen (1968) found that children who were generous in sharing of winnings were independently noted by teachers as outgoing, gregarious and less competitive than peers. Staub (1971c) reported that kindergarten teachers rated as outgoing,those boys in class who helped peers in distress.

Huston, Geis & Wright (1976), after interviewing about 35 individuals who had been reimbursed for injuries incurred while coming to the aid of another, described the intervenors as "angry Samaritans". They found most to be risk-takers and men on familiar and rather amiable terms with violence. These Good Samaritans saw themselves as qualified to provide assistance, enjoyed the limelight and had generally strong feelings about law and order.

Another characteristic which appears frequently in the literature is expressiveness. Hortup & Keller (1960) discovered that overt displays of dependent needs correlated with helping and paying attention. Children who feel free to express their own needs seem more apt to help others. Morrow (1965), in a study of nursery school children, found that expressiveness of feelings correlated with willingness to help a distressed character in a puppet show.

> Perhaps the rendering of aid requires a quality of outgoingness, or a lack of interpersonal timidity, which is often required of the child in expressing his distress or the seeking of help. (Bryan 1975, p. 180)

Studies with adults have shown that witnesses who feel sympathetic and responsible, were more apt to come to the help of others. Liebhart (1972) measured individual differences in both sympathetic orientation and the tendency to take instrumental action to reduce personal discomfort. The emergency dealt with a person in an adjoining room crying and moaning, having had an apparent mishap. Bystanders, high in sympathetic orientation and being disposed to taking action to reduce their own discomfort, were quicker to respond with help than bystanders low on either one or both of the above characteristics.

Prosocial behavior was also associated with high ego strength, self-control and good personal adjustment. In a longitudinal study by Block & Block (1973), the nursery school children considered generous at the age of five, were rated by the teachers as "helpful and cooperative", "concerned with moral issues", "considerate of other children" and "high on ego resiliency and self-control".

Mussen et al.(1970) found that altruists were more self-confident, more satisfied with peer relationships and more self-assured than others. Children of various age groups demonstrated that helping, consideration and donating are related to personal competence in social interactions (Staub, 1970) and a degree of social responsibility (Midlarsky & Bryan, 1972). Similar results were found in studies with adult subjects (Ponozal & Jaccard, 1976;

Staub, 1974; Wilson, 1976). Three studies (Turner, 1948; Cattel & Horowitz, 1958; Friedrich, 1960) defined altruism according to ratings of friends and reported low correlations with altruism and ethical goodness, emotional stability, social acceptability, and social extraversion. These studies must be viewed as no more than suggestive as they did not control for the halo effect and therefore may indicate that people merely rated those they liked as altruistic.

Schwartz & Clausen (1970), in a study with 187 college students, attempted to assess relationships between acceptance of responsibility (AR), awareness of consequences (AC), and internal-external control (I-E), with aiding a subject with an epileptic seizure. Persons high in AR aided the victim more quickly, more often and more directly than those people low in AR. Awareness of consequences and locus of control were not found to be related to helping. Contradicting these findings, several studies are reported which show internal control to be a correlate of helping behavior (Gore & Rotter, 1963; Midlarsky, 1968; Staub, 1970).

Other research hypothesized that certain traits would correlate with helping behavior but the results indicated otherwise and the characteristics do not appear to relate to helping behavior; autonomy, deference, ascendence and submissiveness (Korte, 1971); need for approval (Staub, 1971b); trustworthiness, independence, agreement with new left beliefs (Yakimovich & Salz, 1971).

The research data suggests that the relationship between specific personality traits and altruism is tenuous. This can partially be explained by the variations in subject samples and the independent variables and measures of altruism selected. It may be more important to look at a combination of characteristics, as they relate to intervention, than to consider them one at a time. It seems that some personal characteristics appear to compliment each other in creating a predisposition to help others. These are evidenced in studies by Huston (1976) and Korte (1971) who profiled the Good Samaritan as having a strong sense of morality and social responsibility, and being adventurous, unconventional and sympathetic. Staub (1974) used a composite measure of several personality scales to determine a level of "prosocial orientation". He concluded that there seemed to be a higher correlation between the composite index of prosocial orientation and the degree that bystanders offered help, than between helpfulness and any independently measured personality measure.

It seems possible that personality traits interact with situational antecedents sufficiently enough to make their isolation difficult. Perhaps situational forces may be so strong that personality traits are overridden or brought into conflict.

> ...It is possible, under such circumstances, that personality variables do not have much room for play...a tender hearted person who really wants to help may be too frightened or squeamish to do so. The person who can take a cold-eyed look at an emergency and see it as dangerous, may be cold-hearted when it comes to acting (Takoshian, 1977, pp. 67-68).

Research on traits of persons displaying prosocial behavior has begun to identify general correlates and antecedents and has hinted at the effects of early socialization. There is considerable overlap with the research into the early socialization experiences of the child as related to altruism and the research on moral development.

Moral development

The complex area of moral development, including the capacity for empathy, role taking and level of moral reasoning suggest possible antecedents in the development of prosocial behavior and have been the focus of a variety of research.

Hoffman (1963) indicated that the internalization of moral directives have their basis in early childhood. Weisbrath (1970) found a positive correlation between identification with parents and a display of mature moral judgment. In this context, a mature moral judgment was defined as an indication of the respondent's reliance upon an internal system as opposed to a reliance on external concerns of fear, of detection, or of ensuing punishment. Mature judgments were found to be significantly related to male subjects identifying positively with both parents and females identifying with the father.

The type of parental discipline used was found to foster a high degree of internally motivated moral responses. Three styles of parental discipline were defined and their effect on moral development discussed (Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; and Aronfreed, 1961).

> Power assertion, in which the parent capitalizes on the power and authority over the child; love withdrawal, i.e., direct but non-physical expression of anger, disapproval, etc.,; and induction, consisting of the parents focussing on the consequences of the child's action for others. ...advanced development along various moral dimensions was associated with infrequent use of power assertion and frequent use of induction....love withdrawal, on the other hand, related infrequently to moral development. (Hoffman and Saltzstein, 1967, p. 45)

Aronfreed (1961) sees induction as a verbal and cognitive medium which provides the child with a means of evaluating his own behavior and thus enables him to be independent of external sanctions. Hoffman & Saltzstein (1967) suggest that induction practices provide the stimulation which:

> ...motivates the child to focus his attention on the harm done others...and thus to help integrate his capacity for empathy with the knowledge of the human consequences of his own behavior. (p. 55)

This then suggests that a child accomplishes moral learning through an active and conscious interaction with his environment, "actively adaptive", (Aronfreed, 1961) as opposed to reacting to, or accommodating pre-programmed data, "positively accepting" (Aronfreed, 1961).

Stevenson (1966) found that with an increase in age, the concept of conscience moved from being one of "intropunitive guilt" or the self-punitive responses which follow personal transgressions, to a positive aspect of conscience, "conscience motive", which was indicative of an individual's active concern for others. The latter concept refutes the Freudian notion of "moral agents" as being primarily of a punitive nature. This moral dimension,Stevenson felt, was promoted by the ability to role take.

Kohlberg (1964) investigated the role of ego strength including a variety of dimensions such as intelligent quotient, self-esteem, the ability to maintain a stable focused attention span, the ability to anticipate future events and the disposition to delay gratification. He found them to correlate positively with various moral character typologies (Peck & Havinghurst, 1960) and experimental tests of resistance to temptation (Mischel & Gilligan, 1964).

Piaget and Kohlberg are two researchers who have postulated that moral reasoning proceeds sequentially through a series of stages. Before reporting on the research, which attempts to relate the stage of moral development to displays of prosocial behavior, these two influential theories of moral judgment will be outlined.

Piaget's theory of moral development

Piaget (1932) stated that the nature of children's moral judgments can be traced through a developmental sequence of three distinctive stages. To reach this conclusion, he investigated children's responses to questions about rules, punishment, authority, transgressions, lying, equality, and reciprocity among people, as presented to them in moral dilemmas in short story form.

He called his first stage "heteronomous morality", "moral realism" or the "morality of constraint" and detailed it as a characteristic of preoperational children. During this stage the child regards a rule to be:

> ...self subsistent and independent on the mind, as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself. (Piaget, 1965, p. 106)

At this stage, anything to do with rules, obligation and commands is external to the individual, inflexible, and unchangeable.

> The child regards the rules of the game as external and unchangeable, stemming from parental or divine authority; suggested changes in the rules are usually resisted and new rules 'are not fair', even if others agree to abide by them. (Flavell, 1963; p. 242)

The child, at this stage, believes in imminent justice and in the absoluteness of values. Given the choice at this stage, severe and arbitrary punishments are favored.

There begins a second and intermediate stage at the age of seven or eight. This involves a greater interaction with peers and a move toward a more egalitarian, give-and-take relationship with others. Punishment becomes more reciprocal and is more befitting the crime. The belief in imminent justice has waned and the nature of distributive justice has evolved from a belief in the rightness of whatever reward or punishment the authority figure prescribed as "fair", to a well entrenched egalitarian expectation.

The third stage involves genuine cooperation and is called "autonomous morality". It develops at about eleven or twelve years of age. At this stage rules and ethics may be arrived at by consensus as to what is good. The influence of the emerging properties of operational thought and peer group interaction, lead the child from moral constraint to "morality of cooperation" and the acceptance of the nature of equity and distributive justice. Extenuating circumstance, motivation and intention can now play a major role in moral judgments. Social contracts with peers are founded upon mutual respect; actions are no longer judged by their objective consequences only, but also by the intentions of the actor responsible for them; and punishments are now restitutive, rather than arbitrary, and may be ignored if punishment is seen as unnecessary for reformation.

This third level of understanding involves a mature and autonomous concept of justice and is to a large extent the product of cooperation, reciprocity and role taking. Piaget believes that peer groups have no absolute authority figure and children, therefore, have the freedom and opportunity to develop ideas of equality, group solidarity and cooperation.

In reference to the relationship of changes in stages, Piaget (1967) states:

> The collective rule is at first something external to the individual and consequently sacred to him; then as he gradually makes it his own, it comes to that extent to be felt as the free product of mutual agreement and an autonomous conscience. And with regard to practical use, it is only natural that a mystical respect for laws should be accompanied by a rudimentary knowledge and application of their contents, while a rational and well-founded respect is accompanied by an effective application of each rule in detail. (p. 28-29)

Piaget's work continually emphasizes the influence of adult constraint, social cooperation and intellectual development as primary variables influencing the development of moral judgment. In this way, it is an excellent example of a cognitive developmental theory which takes into account the role of social experience. Once children begin to divorce themselves from the concept of rules as having mystical origins, they develop a realization that rules should be obeyed because of their social function and for the "spirit of the game". With the erosion of egocentrism and an enlargement of social awareness, a more sophisticated concept of "what is just" evolves.

> The ethics of authority, which is that of duty and obedience, leads, in the domain of justice, to the confusion of what is just with the content of established law and to the acceptance of expiatory punishment. The ethic of mutual respect, which is that of good (as opposed to duty), and of autonomy, leads, in the domain of justice, to the development of equality, which is the idea at the bottom of distributive justice and of reciprocity. (Piaget, 1965, p. 324)

Through role taking, children develop an understanding that others should be treated as they themselves would like to be treated. The merging of altruism and rationality pushes the child beyond the "dogmatism of equality" to what Piaget refers to as a stage of "equity". At this stage:

> Justice itself is extended along a purely autonomous line of development into a higher form of reciprocity, in which judgments are not purely based on equality, but are rather a response, on the individual's part, to the situation in which they find themselves. (Piaget, 1965, p. 282)

Although, according to Piaget, the "morality of cooperation" eventually succeeds in dominating the "morality of constraint", it never becomes an either-or proposition. Piaget argues, as does Kohlberg (1971), that various levels or stages of moral reasoning can co-exist in the mind of both the child and adult and that, depending on how a situation is perceived,a variety of qualitatively different moral judgments are possible.

Piaget's conception of behavior as based on an organismic-environmental model is particularly relevent when viewing altruistic behavior and debating the relative contribution of internal and situational determinants. The interaction between the respondent's "definition of the situation" and their previous experiences with a variety of moral orientations, will influence the judgment made. The dynamics of moral decision-making, according to Piaget, can be viewed as an active adaptation by an individual to a particular type of social stimulation, especially in those situations which are ambiguous or of a dilemmic nature.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development

Lawrence Kohlberg has built upon Piaget's theory of moral development, further articulating the linkage between cognitive and moral development.

Kohlberg (1969) makes the following assumptions about the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development:

> 1. Basic development involves basic transformations of cognitive structure which cannot be defined or explained by the parameters of associationistic learning, and which must be explained by parameters of organizational wholes or systems of internal relations.
>
> 2. Development of cognitive structure is the result of processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the structure of the environment, rather than being the direct result of maturation or the direct result of learning...
>
> 3. Cognitive structures are always structures (schemata) of action. While cognitive activities move from the sensory-motor to the symbolic, to verbal-propositional modes, the organization of these modes is always an organization of action upon object.
>
> 4. The direction of development of cognitive structure is towards greater equilibrium in this organism--environment interaction, i.e. of greater balance or reciprocity between the action of the organism upon the (perceived) object (or situation) and the action of the (perceived) object upon the organism. (p. 348)

The above assumptions hold for cognitive developmental theory generally. However, in order to apply this to social emotional development, the following assumptions are relevant:

> 5. Affective development and functioning and cognitive development and functioning are not distinct realms. 'Affective' and 'cognitive' development are parallel; they represent different perspectives and context in defining structural change.

> 6. There is a fundamental unity of personality organization and development termed the ego, or the self. While there are various strands of social development...these strands are united by their common reference to a 'single concept or self' in a 'single social world'. Social development is...the restructuring of the (1) concept of self, (2) in its relationship to concepts of other people, (3) conceived as being in a common social world with social standards. In addition to the unity of level of social development due to general cognitive development...there is a further unity of development to a common factor of ego maturity.
>
> 7. All the basic processes involved in 'physical' cognitions, and in stimulating developmental changes in these cognitions, are also basic to social development. In addition, however, social cognition always involves role-taking.
>
> 8. The direction of social or ego development is also toward an equilibrium or reciprocity between the self's action and those others toward the self...The social analogy to logical and physical conservations is the maintenance of an 'ego-identity' throughout the transformations of various role relationships...(Kohlberg, 1969, p. 348-349)

Kohlberg based his stage theory on a series of interviews which presented to subjects several moral dilemmas in story form. Probing questions were asked to determine the reasons underlying each subject's responses. It was considered that the reasons behind a choice were more important than the choice itself. The schema of stages that resulted was more complex and intensive than Piaget's and involved development from childhood to adulthood. It involved six stages of moral development which were divided into three moral levels as summarized in Table I. The stages were said to be:

> ...invariant in sequence, hierarchical, universal and intrinsic to the species, although any particular individual's development may cease at any stage. Each successive stage is seen as qualitatively different from the others, a more advanced 'structured whole', embracing a new, more comprehensive, and more coherent cognitive organization of moral thinking. (Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, p. 117)

TABLE I

Kohlberg's Six Moral Stages

	Content of Stage		
Level and Stage	What Is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	*Social Perspective of Stage*
LEVEL I—PRECONVENTIONAL Stage 1—Heteronomous Morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	*Egocentric point of view.* Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.
Stage 2—Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests, too.	*Concrete individualistic perspective.* Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
LEVEL II—CONVENTIONAL Stage 3—Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	*Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals.* Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.
Stage 4—Social System and Conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations (Easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text.)	*Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.* Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
LEVEL III—POST-CONVENTIONAL, or PRINCIPLED Stage 5—Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like *life* and *liberty*, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."	*Prior-to-society perspective.* Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.
Stage 6—Universal Ethical Principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	*Perspective of a moral point of view* from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

(Lickona, 1976, pp. 34-35.)

Kohlberg analysed the stage of reasoning displayed by individuals by focusing on the quality of the judgments, the ways of perceiving conflict situations, and the moral principles espoused along with their applications to a number of different kinds of issues, values, or moral institutions found in every society and culture:

> ...laws and rules; conscience; personal roles of affection; authority; civil rights; contract, trust and justice in exchange; punishment and justice; the value of life; property rights and values; truth; sex and sexual love. (Kohlberg, 1967, p. 43)

Like Piaget, Kohlberg believes that progress from one stage to the next is dependent on the maturation of the organism, and the interaction of experience. Kohlberg believes that maturity of moral judgment is linked but is not congruent with cognitive development. That belief is supported by the findings of others (Lee, 1971; Harris, Mussen & Rutherford, 1976; Arbuthnot, 1973; Thomlinson, Keasey & Keasey, 1974). Those capable of formal operations were not necessarily at moral reasoning stages 5 and 6, however, those subjects who showed post-conventional levels of reasoning, all showed formal operational thought. Cognitive ability may be necessary for principled moral thought, but it is not sufficient.

Kohlberg (1976) stated that moral development may depend upon cognitive structure but social stimulation, involving social interaction and moral decision-making, is necessary. Role-taking is considered to be the most enhancing experience, because of its potential for individuals to emphathize with others and to perceive things from others' point of view. Role-taking also gives children the opportunity to become aware of discrepancies in reasoning and conflict between self and others' viewpoints. Kohlberg believes that this opportunity for conflict resolution, between differing points of view, can bring individuals to higher and more mature levels of moral reasoning. The theory that role-taking opportunity enhances moral maturity has been substantiated empirically (Selman, 1971; Giraldo, 1972).

> Although moral judgments entail role-taking – putting oneself in the place of the various people involved in a moral conflict-attainment of a given role-taking stage,...is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral development... In understanding the effects of social environment on moral development, then, we must consider that environment's provision of role-taking opportunities to the child. Variation in role-taking opportunities exist in terms of the child's relation to his family, his peer group, his school and his social status vis-a-vis the larger economic and political structure of the society. (Kohlberg, 1976; p. 49,50)

Much of the research supporting Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning consists of verbalizations or descriptions of hypothetical behavior. Many have thought it likely that moral judgment may be a correlate of moral conduct but again the literature does not clearly establish this. Studies examining the relationship often reach ambiguous conclusions and are plagued by methodological problems.

> Instead of broad links between global dispositions and diverse prosocial behavior, the relations involve highly complex and specific interactions which cannot be adequately understood without carefully delineating the particular situation as well as the particular person variable...In that light, the specificity of the relation between social behavior and conditions, traditionally, has been interpreted as reflecting the inadequacies of the measures, poor sampling and the limitations of the particular clinical judges or raters. (Mischel, 1976; p. 105)

Kohlberg (1969b) investigated the variables of prosocial behavior and gave some evidence of a relationship between level of moral reasoning and moral conduct. However, close scrutiny of the significance of these findings raises some doubt about the internal consistency of moral reasoning across situations.

> While behavior may often be highly situation-specific, it also seems true that in daily life people tend to construe each other as if each were highly consistent and they construct consistent personalities for each other, even on the basis of relatively inconsistent behavioral fragments.... It is remarkable how each of us usually manages to reconcile his seemingly diverse behaviors into one subjectively consistent whole. The same individual who cheats on one occasion, but not on another, who lies in one context, but is truthful in another, who steals at one time but helps a friend generously and unselfishly at another, may still readily construe himself as basically honest and moral. (Mischel, 1969, p. 606)

The classical research of Hartshorne & May (1930) indicated that children's behavior was more a function of situational factors than of moral character. Their study was primarily interested in the child's ability to resist the temptation to deviate from normative expectations in situations which were supposedly free from punishment or detection.

> No one is honest or dishonest by 'nature'. Where conflict arises between a child and his environment, deception is a natural mode of adjustment, having in itself no 'moral' significance....(also there is a) larger place occupied by the 'situation' in the suggestion and control of conduct, not only in its larger aspects, such as the example of other pupils, the personality of the teacher, etc., but also in its more subtle aspects, such as the nature of the opportunity to deceive, the kind of material or test on which it is responsible, the relation of the child to this material, and so on.... (Hartshorne & May, 1930; p. 412-413)

Kohlberg (1968) believed that the Hartshorne & May study indicated that cheating in one situation did not predict cheating in another and concluded that moral conduct has little to do with verbal tests or moral knowledge.

Attempting to formulate the concept of moral character, Burton (1963) concluded from Hartshorne & May (1930) study, that there was some evidence for an underlying trait of honesty. Kohlberg (1968) argued, referring to Burton's findings that:

> ...there is some personal consistency in honest behavior by general personality traits. These traits, however, seem not to be traits of moral conscience, but rather a set of ego abilities corresponding to common-sense notions of prudence and will. (p. 485)

A study by Schwartz, Feldman, Brown & Heingartner (1969) correlated stages of moral thought with helpfulness and cheating. The relationship with helpfulness was not found significant, but the relationship with cheating was significant at .05 level. At the same time, however, the data indicated tnat achievement needs were almost equally strongly related to cheating behavior.

Nelson, Grinder and Biaggio (1969); Schwartz, Feldman, Brown and Heingartner (1969); Kohlberg (1963); found that children at low stages of moral reasoning, as assessed by Kohlberg's measures, were more prone to delinquent behavior and cheating, in experimental situations,than others. Similarly,those children and adolescents with higher stages of moral reasoning were found more likely to display positive behavior, such as helping and generosity, than were those peers at lower stages of moral reasoning. (Kohlberg, 1969; Staub, 1974)

Huston & Korte (1976) reported on an unpublished study by McNamee which attempted to relate bystander responses to moral reasoning as measured by Kohlberg's scale. The study dealt with a dilemma in which a variety of responses were possible. The participants:

> ...follow an experimenter's lead and ignore pleas for help from a subject who seemed to be 'freaked out' on a psychedelic drug, or they could ignore the implicit demand of the experimenter to proceed with the experiment and instead offer to help the distressed individual, even though this would delay the experiment and perhaps anger the experimenter. The bystander's response was categorized first in terms of whether or not he or she offered assistance, and then, if assistance was offered in terms of the nature of the aid, using three categories: 1) statements of sympathy or protest; 2) offers for information about where the person could go for help; and 3) provisions of personal assistance, such as taking the person home or to a place where help could be secured. (p. 277)

The 124 participants, ranging from age 18 to 25, were scored for stage of moral reasoning based on their responses to Kohlberg's classical dilemmas. The findings showed that those who were higher stage reasoners helped more frequently and more directly, than did those subjects who were at lower stages. More specifically persons at stage 2 helped 11% of the time; stage 3 - 27%; stage 4 - 35%; stage 5 - 68%; stage 6 - 100% of the time. Persons at stages 5 and 6 offered more than sympathy or information and provided personal assistance, whereas lower level reasoners did not. Staub (1974) found significant correlations between several indicies of prosocial orientation, including moral reasoning and helping behavior: but these associations depend on the specific conditions, the particular measures used, and the exact nature of the help needed.

Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) summarize the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development as follows:

> Moral development involves a continual process of matching moral view to one's experience of life in a social world. Experiences of conflict in this process generate movement from structural stage to structural stage. Even after attainment of the highest stage an individual can reach, there is continuous experience of conflict. The developmental product of this conflict is stabilization, i.e., a greater consistency of structure within itself (greater stage purity) and a greater consistency between thought structure and action. (p. 118)

How people reason about moral dilemmas and the age-related changes in moral reasoning is informative but this understanding does not negate the need to understand many other aspects of and influences on moral behavior.

Although much of the research previously cited suggested that internalized qualities are the main variables affecting prosocial behavior, one cannot overlook the interaction between the person and the situation encountered.

Situation Variables

Rosenhan, Moore and Underwood (1976) stipulate:

> ...we are commonly and often to our dismay, creatures of our environment. Our behaviors vary often to a great extent, according to the environment pressures that impinge upon us. (p. 241)

An individual's behavior is not always consistent or generalizable. For example, some people appear to help in one circumstance and not in another.

> Interpersonal variability in prosocial behavior, or variations in the individual's reactions from time to time and from situation to situation, can be understood only by examining the immediate situational contexts the actor encounters. (Mussen, Eisenberg-Berg, 1976, p. 142)

The nature of the research on bystander intervention is varied. Most emergency situations are characterized by two basic qualities:

1. The person in distress or danger is in a potentially severe situation.

2. In order to not have the fate of the distressed person deteriorate, some sort of intervention is necessary.

Some situational factors which seem to have influenced intervention and have been reported in the literature are:

1. The critical appearance of the situation.
2. The number of other people present.
3. The behavior (helpful, encouraging or discouraging) of other bystanders if the subject is not alone.
4. The considered self-expertise and the perceptions of the amount of expert help nearby.

Decision-making process

Latane & Darley (1968) support the position that it is situational factors which govern the likelihood of people intervening to help others in distress. They believe that bystander intervention depends on a series of decisions. Accordingly, the bystander must:

1. Notice something wrong.
2. Interpret it as an emergency.
3. Accept the responsibility to act.
4. Consider what form of assistance is to be given.
5. Decide how to enact his intervention.

The conclusions that were reached (Latane & Darley, 1970) were that the bystander had to make some very serious decisions, usually under stress, threat and urgency, and that intervention on the part of the individual depended on how factors affected the decision-making process. These cognitive components and processes can be summarized as "perception, thinking, reasoning, problem-solving and decision-making " (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, p. 109). Latane & Darley (1968) stated that before we can help others, there has to be an expression of sympathy or consideration, and that the situation has to be perceived and interpreted accurately in relation to others' feelings and emotions. Also, a decision has to be made regarding the type of action one should take in order to effectively and beneficially aid another in distress. Finally, a plan of execution for prosocial action must be formulated.

Displays of altruistic behavior are not limited to emergency situations. People are dependent on each other in major and minor ways, but in our society, although people ask for help, they do not necessarily receive it. Many of the experiments conducted in the field with non-emergency situations, such as asking for change, time, street directions, or for aid in carrying out a task, suggest that behavior was affected by the amount of risk involved and the direction of the present social pressure (Clark & Word, 1972; Darley & Latane, 1968, Gergen, Gergen and Meter, 1972; Schwartz, 1970b). Intervention was more likely if potentially little harm would come to the bystander and the possibility of reward made intervention almost certain.

The Presence of bystanders

There is also research (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Rodin, 1969; Smith, Smyth & Lien, 1970) that indicates that the victim is much surer of having someone come to his rescue, if the bystander is alone. When a bystander is one of many, it seems that situational factors such as the relationship with the other bystanders, the reaction as to the seriousness as assessed by others, and the suspected expertise of the other bystanders, may hinder intervention (Schwartz & Clausen, 1970).

Several studies suggest that situational factors can focus responsibility on one particular bystander or diffuse it amongst many. Korte (1971) reported that bystanders who felt unencumbered or closer to the situation physically, were more prone to helping, than bystanders who perceived an equal opportunity with others.

One study (Latane & Darley, 1968) was intended to assess how bystanders interpreted an "ambiguous" event. They concluded that individual bystanders were powerfully influenced by the reaction of people around them; that inaction resulted because people feared to make an inappropriate response or thought that others may be able to act more appropriately than themselves. Unambigious emergencies (Clark & Word, 1972, Yakimovich & Satz, 1971) resulted in more frequent and readily given intervention than did ambiguous emergencies. People in need of help were more likely to receive such, if the bystander knew the person in distress was sick rather than drunk (Piliavin, Rodin, Piliavin, 1969).

Latane & Rodin (1969) hypothesized that the interpretation by others of the seriousness of a situation would be a strong determinant in individual's behavior. To test this, a situation was created in which subjects heard a woman in an adjoining room fall and cry out in pain. The subjects were either alone or with a friend, a stranger or confidant. The woman received least help when the subject was with a confidant who acted in an unresponsive manner. More help was given if the subject was with a stranger, who gave positive cues and who made intervention potentially less embarrassing. The presence of a friend tended to elicit the most positive action.

> ...the failure to intervene may be better understood by knowing the relationship among bystanders rather than that between a bystander and a victim. (Latane & Darley, 1968, p. 221)

Darley, Teger & Lewis (1973) found that 80% of bystanders helped when they were arranged so that they could see one another's initial reaction to the event. The reverse, however, was true when they were seated out of each other's sight, then only 20% helped. Subjects paired with similar, rather than dissimilar participants, placed greater trust in each other's ability to act and therefore intervened less often (5% helped) than those who thought they had little in common with an inactive bystander (35% helped) (Smith, Smythe & Lien, 1973).

It has been suggested that modelling occurs in a single incident or with very short exposure. Attempts have been made to link this brief exposure to a model with early socialization and identification antecedents of altruism. Bryan & Test (1967) demonstrated that observation of a charitable model promoted congruent altrusistic behavior; motorists were more apt to help fix a flat tire if they drove past a model helping fix a flat;shoppers contributed more to a Salvation Army kettle in the 20 seconds after a model gave than in the 20 seconds before he gave.

Bandura & Walters (1963) show that the presence of a model can serve to elicit either prosocial or antisocial behavior. The now famous Milgram (1965) experiment reported that the presence of models who exert group pressure can have a liberating effect on the subject instructed to give shocks. Similar findings by Rosenhan (1969) indicated that models who were disobedient reduced the obedience of other subjects.

> ...the popular tendency to attribute bystander inaction to apathy, indifference or alienation from social norms does not really explain very much...The presence of other people serves to inhibit the impulse to help....each will be less likely to notice the emergency, less likely to decide that it is an emergency and less likely to act even if he thinks there is an emergency. These effects are due to the fact that each person can both see and be seen by the others. (Latane & Darley, 1970, p. 38)

Similarly, modelling of inaction seems also to occur. An incident reported in the Edmonton Journal (Sept. 1976) told of a man injured in an automobile accident, who subsequently drowned in a ditch of water because no one would turn him over. When bystanders who had stood by and watched were asked why they did not help, they consistently reported expecting others to intervene or fear of legal consequences if they helped the injured man. People rationalized not helping even when the risk to themselves was not high.

The literature on bystander intervention appears to indicate that both a diffusion of responsibility and the behavior of bystanders influence the display of prosocial behavior (Latane & Rodin, 1969).

Characteristics of the beneficiary

Characteristics of the person needing assistance may also affect the behavior of bystanders. Those less able to fend for themselves, such as children (Ross, 1971) and the blind (Ross & Brabend, 1973) were more likely to receive aid from adults. If, however, the bystander should assume that there are others more capable of dealing with the situation, such as an onlooker who is a doctor and the situation requires medical care, the bystander usually stepped back and let the other act (Schwartz & Clausen, 1970).

One of the problems in generalizing from research on situational determinants is the methodological problem of laboratory versus naturalistic studies. Much of the research in this area has been an examination of simulations done under controlled circumstances. It would seem premature to accept conclusions regarding situational factors on the basis of these laboratory experiments. Before accepting the conclusions regarding situational factors, we must know more about emergencies that occur in the natural environment where the extremes of situational variables are beyond the control of the experimenter.

Darley & Batson (1978) conducted a simulation of the Good Samaritan parable with seminary students. The students were given a limited amount of time in which to choose, prepare, and deliver a sermon. The students were required to move from one building to another and enroute encountered a staged victim. Regardless of their religious convictions, the students behaved more like the Priest and Levite, than the Samaritan.

> Indeed on several occasions a seminary student going to give his talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan, literally stepped over the victim as he hurried on his way. (Darley & Batson, 1973, p. 197)

This study raises several obvious difficulties with simulated research where the sample (seminary students or college students) is homogenious and may not be representative of the general population. This, therefore, restricts the generalizability of the results.

The results of the research on situational variables suggest that temporary states can be induced in benefactors that mediate their altruistic responses. The state may be affective and/or cognitive and relate to moods, feelings of competence, empathy and the presence of real or vicarious positive or negative reinforcement. The temporarily induced state may affect the benefactors' progress through the outlined steps in invervention.

Summary

The literature in this chapter reflects a lack of consensus regarding the role of internal and external variables and their effect on the display of prosocial behavior. The argument remains unresolved as to whether internal or external characteristics have the greater effect. Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg (1977) say:

> ...there are some impressive consistencies, across situations and over time, in individuals prosocial behavior. These are largely the products of enduring, internalized qualities, predispositions and orientations that are shaped by socialization experiences, the capacity for empathy, role taking ability and the stage of moral development. (p. 139)

Modelling seems to have a positive effect on others, but the duration of the imitated behavior is temporary and related to other traits of the model and extent of exposure. Generally there is agreement that a positive, warm and egalitarian relationship with parents results in a predisposition to prosocial behavior on the part of the children.

Only tentative conclusions can be drawn from the research on personality traits as they relate to prosocial behavior. There is a lack of specificity regarding the settings of the prosocial behavior and a lack of commonality that is cause for confusion. The situations investigated ranged from simply sharing of candy, to saving fugitives from persecution. The attempt to relate personality traits to these various altruistic acts may be acceptable in themselves but the results are too diverse and incomplete to serve as a comprehensive personality profile for those who act prosocially. Some conclusions seem promising. In situations requiring bystander intervention, the research has identified some traits common to interveners. Those who act seem to be well adjusted, sociable, unassuming, high in ego strength, self-controlled and self-confident individuals.

Piaget, and later Kohlberg, have offered a cognitive developmental theory of moral reasoning, Kohlberg specifically raises the issue that reasoning does not necessarily predict behavior and that certain behavior may be the result of different stages of reasoning. Several researchers attempted to correlate cognitive reasoning with action, but concluded that if there is a relationship it is a very tenuous one. Contradicting the research that shows internal variables to be the most influential, are many studies citing external variables which significantly affected behavior. There was considerable agreement among research findings as to which situational variables were influential. Several trends appear:

1) intervention depends on a series of decisions; 2) the individuals in distress are more assured of assistance if the bystander is alone; 3) interpretation by other bystanders can be a strong determinant in behavior. There is continuing ambiguity as to whether internal or external antecedents have the greater effect on prosocial behavior.

There is some evidence that effects of the variables cannot be measured one at a time because of the complex interaction between the variables. Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg (1977) suggest the need for studies which:

> ...focus on the individual as a whole - 'in vivo,' as it were - and the exploration of the multiple factors operating simultaneously and in complex relationships to each other that direct his or her prosocial orientations and behavior. The kind of clinical and naturalistic study we advocate...permits multi-dimensional assessment and evaluation of the prosocial consequences of 'patterns of interactions' among personal and situation variables. (p. 169)

The literature seems to generate as many questions as it provides answers and indicates many possible areas for future research. From this stimulus, the present study looks at the Good Samaritan in the living social psychological context of subjects who have demonstrated outstanding prosocial behavior by risking their own lives to save another. Chapter III details the research focus and methodology, describes the subjects and outlines situations which were the focus for this study.

CHAPTER III

THE METHOD, THE SUBJECTS AND THE SITUATIONS

This study was designed to investigate and describe in detail some selected dimensions of prosocial behavior, with the hope that an analysis of the data collected would provide some insights and generalizations which would contribute to the social psychological profile of the Good Samaritan.

Naturalistic study

The survey of the related literature makes clear that there are a variety of approaches used to study altruistic behavior. Although it is not the intent to discredit the findings of researchers working under controlled conditions or simulated settings, the literature does show a need for more naturalistic studies, where behavior can be studied in unpredictable and experimentally uncontrollable situations. It is hoped that the complexity of the naturalistic study and all that it entails may result in some concrete and revealing insights about persons who have demonstrated prosocial behavior and add to the profile currently available.

In this naturalistic study the researcher does not stipulate the variables or arrange for events to happen, but rather has chosen a descriptive survey approach to investigate events that have already taken place.

Descriptive Survey: Observation with Insight

This approach involves looking intently at a certain phenomenon--in this case prosocial action - and then describing precisely what has been observed. The hope is as Murray (1941) states:

> By the observation of many parts one finally arrives at a synthetic conception of the whole, and then, having grasped the latter, one can reinterpret and understand the former. (p. 1)

As Becker (1958) points out, this approach is often used when something more than the testing of clearly stated 'a priori' hypotheses is called for.

> Sociologists...attempt to make their research theoretically meaningful, but they assume they do not know enough about the organization 'a priori' to identify relevant problems and hypotheses and that they must discover these in the course of the research. Though participant observation can be used to test 'a priori' hypotheses,...this is typically not the case. My discussion refers to the kind of participant observation study which seeks to discover hypotheses as well as to test them. (p. 652)

As Dalton (1964) suggests, the descriptive survey method is nonetheless demanding of the researcher:

> If a choice were possible, I would naturally prefer simple, rapid and infallible methods. If I could find such methods, I would avoid the time consuming, difficult, and suspect variants of 'participant observation' with which I have become associated. (p. 60)

However, Best (1970) feels that descriptive research is a particularly appropriate method in the behavioral sciences. This view is supported by many other researchers (Allport, 1942; Shapiro, 1961; Dukes, 1965; Dabrowski, 1972).

> Although some experimental studies of human behavior can be appropriately carried on, both in the laboratory and in the field, the prevailing method of the social sciences is descriptive. Under the conditions that naturally occur in the home, the classroom, the recreation center, the factory or the community, human behavior can be systematically examined and analysed. This analysis may lead to the modification of

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> factors or influences that determine the nature of human interaction. It is through this modification of factors that social institutions may become more effective influences in the promotion of human welfare. (Best, 1970, p. 117)

Carkhuff and Berenson (1967) advocate the multidimensional approach to investigations and believe in including a variety of sources of data (individuals, bystanders, associates, social context, etc.) in any descriptive survey.

The descriptive survey method involves more than fact gathering and reporting and is used in order to analyze and interpret the meaning or significance of what is described. Data gathered, focus on the whole process and are interpreted in light of previous findings. Attempts are made by the researcher to offer some greater understanding of human behavior and possibly discover some new hypotheses, causal relationships or generalizations regarding the phenomena investigated.

Leedy (1974) outlines the basic structure of the descriptive survey and indicates its primary characteristics:

> 1. The descriptive survey method deals with a situation that demands the 'technique of observation' as the principal means of collecting the data.
>
> 2. The population for the study must be carefully chosen, clearly defined, and specifically delimited in order to set precise parameters for ensuring discreteness to the population.
>
> 3. Data in descriptive survey research are particularly susceptible to distortion through the induction of bias into the research design. Particular attention should be given to safeguard the data from the influence of bias.
>
> 4. Although the descriptive survey method relies upon observation for the acquisition of its data, those data must then be organized and presented systematically so that valid and accurate conclusions may be drawn. (p. 80)

Observation Phase: Looking at the Phenomena

A variety of observational tools and techniques were employed in this study in order to gather the required data.

It is hoped that, by examining in detail nine separate events that occurred in the lives of ten individuals, a contribution can be made to the current research on altruistic behavior. The approach is multi-faceted and attempts to gather data in a variety of ways on many aspects of the phenomena. Despite the claim that the researcher is not limited by strict 'a priori' hypotheses, no pretence is made that the data represent a complete assessment or is all inclusive.

The behavior and motivation of the individual who partakes in prosocial behavior begins to make more sense when we understand more about that individual and his situation. Similarly the meaning of the test scores and other data make more sense when the composite profile of the individual is available. The intent is to add to, substantiate, or question parts of the profile currently available.

Observation was conceived broadly and the "looking" was not restricted to the visual senses. The sample of the study was "observed" by means of interviews, an inventory, and available written reports.

The Interview: background, rationale and procedure

> When dealing with information which may be of a personal and confidential nature, the face to face contact with people may be the most satisfying and productive. (Good, 1972, p. 16)

Because of the nature of some of the information required from the sample, the interview was chosen as the most useful technique of observation. It was felt that the direct communication link established between subject and researcher in an interview had some obvious advantages over information gathering questionnaires. The interview encouraged the establishment of a rapport and enhanced the possibility of validity and completion. The investigator could clarify and probe in order to gain greater insights (Adams, 1958; Mouly, 1970).

Coles (1967) considered that his challenge as an interviewer was "to bring alive to the extent I possibly can a number of lives ...(information) entrusted to a person like me, an outsider, a stranger, a listener, an observer." (p. 39). It was with this encouragement from the literature that an interview of approximately two hour's duration was conducted with each member of the sample. Interviews were conducted in the subjects' homes after an appointment had been arranged by telephone. Each interview was tape recorded and consisted of two distinct parts, each reflecting a particular interview strategy. Interviews can be classified under three general headings: the scheduled standardized interview, the non-scheduled standardized interview and the non-standardized interview (Richardson, Dohrevend, and Klein, 1965). The first and the third type were used in this study.

The scheduled standardized interview adheres to the wording and order of questions of the schedule in order to gain specific, classifiable information. In this research this interview technique was used in administering Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview Form. The Form A protocol, which was used to evaluate Kohlberg's six stages of moral reasoning, consist of three stories covering two issues each as follows. The standard Form A contains three stories which probe two issues on each of the three stories.

> Story 1: Heinz steals the drug.
> Issues: Life, punishment.
>
> Story 11: The father breaks a promise.
> Issues: Contract, personal relationship.
>
> Story III: One man cons, another steals.
> Issues: Property, and Conscience. (Kohlberg 1976, p. 45)

The subjects' responses were tape recorded and transcribed for the purpose of scoring. The scoring system used in analyzing the content of the protocols was the intuitive issue scoring. This is considered the most valid method of scoring, because it is applicable to any moral dilemma. (Kohlberg, 1976) The same method of scoring was used on the subject's reasoning about his own prosocial behavior in the situations examined in this study. This method is considered reliable (90% agreement) when carried out by trained or experienced scorers. (Kohlberg, 1976) The subject's level of development was arrived at by determining the predominant stage in his reasoning.

The second part of the interview in this research was of the non-standardized variety. The interviewer had in mind several dimensions he wished to explore during the interview: 1) the individual's perception of the event (display of prosocial behavior) and its context; 2)the individual's reasoning immediately prior to and during the prosocial act; and 3) clarification and elaboration of various possible antecedents of the behavior.

This list was not designed to be exclusive or restrictive. The intent was to gather as much information as possible about the researcher's areas of concern and the questions posed flowed from the interviewer's grasp of the total study.

Phillips (1971) feels that the advantage of the non-standardized interview lies within the context of discovery, for it is possible that a knowledgeable interviewer may be sufficiently stimulated by the respondent's answer to uncover valid information about the area under investigation. The literature provided an abundant source of procedures and techniques that were considered when the interviews were conducted.

Kluckhohn (1939) felt that if the interviewee is saying something important, he should be encouraged to continue, so in this study the interviewer tried not to interrupt and encouraged the individuals to be as complete as possible in their disclosures. Every attempt was made by the researcher to avoid the use of censorial language (lazy, brave, bad, good) during the interview, to understand the individual's perspective, and to avoid being judgmental or guilty of stereotyping (Cattel, 1973).

The interviewer attempted to pay close attention throughout the entire interview. A tape recorder was used, but care was taken to keep it from becoming a distraction. Cattel (1973) cautions:

> If there is a rule about this form of research it might be reduced to something as simple as 'pay attention'. Pay attention to what the person does, says and feels;... pay attention to what is evoked by these conversations and perceptions...Paying attention implies an openness, not any special or metaphysical kind of openness, but merely a watch on oneself, a self-consciousness, a belief that everything one takes in from the outside and experiences within one's own interior is worthy of consideration and essential for understanding and honoring those whom one encounters. (p. 351)

Finally the interviewer took time to be reflective (Coles, 1971); to examine the meanings conveyed by his words and gestures and to remain constantly alert to the interviewee's reactions and responses.

The Personality Research Form (PRF)

This instrument was chosen because it was

> ...designed to yield conveniently a set of scores for personality traits, broadly relevant to the functioning of individuals in a wide variety of situations. It is thus primarily focused upon areas of normal functioning, rather than upon psychopathology. (Jackson, 1967, p. 4)

Originally, Henry Murray (1938) and his colleagues at Harvard, attempted to describe as comprehensively as possible "variables of personality". Jackson has modified these "variables" in the light of much research and developed the PRF. There are a total of twenty-two scales developed to include the wide variety of areas of human functioning. The variables of the PRF are listed in alphabetical order along with the description of their traits in Table II.

This form was considered especially suitable for this study because many of the individual scales measure traits which the literature associates with the profile of individuals displaying pro-social behavior.

TABLE II

PERSONALITY RESEARCH FORM SCALES

SCALE	DESCRIPTION OF HIGH SCORER
Abasement	Shows a high degree of humility; accepts blame and criticism even when not deserved; exposes himself to situations where he is in an inferior position; tends to be self-effacing.
Achievement	Aspires to accomplish difficult tasks; maintains high standards and is willing to work toward distant goals; responds positively to competition; willing to put forth effort to attain excellence.
Affiliation	Enjoys being with friends and people in general; accepts people readily; makes efforts to win friendships and maintain associations with people.
Aggression	Enjoys combat and argument; easily annoyed; sometimes willing to hurt people to get his way; may seek to "get even" with people whom he perceives as having harmed him.
Autonomy	Tries to break away from restraints, confinement, or restrictions of any kind; enjoys being unattached, free, not tied to people, places, or obligations; may be rebellious when faced with restraints.
Change	Likes new and different experiences; dislikes routine and avoids it; may readily change opinions or values in different circumstances; adapts readily to changes in environment.
Cognitive Structure	Does not like ambiguity or uncertainty in information; wants all questions answered completely; desires to make decisions based upon definite knowledge, rather than upon guesses or probabilities.
Defendence	Readily suspects that people mean him harm or are against him; ready to defend himself at all times; takes offense easily; does not accept criticism readily.
Dominance	Attempts to control his environment, and to influence or direct other people; expresses opinions forcefully; enjoys the role of leader and may assume it spontaneously.
Endurance	Willing to work long hours; doesn't give up quickly on a problem; persevering, even in the face of great difficulty; patient and unrelenting in his work habits.
Exhibition	Wants to be the center of attention; enjoys having an audience; engages in behavior which wins the notice of others; may enjoy being dramatic or witty.
Harmavoidance	Does not enjoy exciting activities, especially if danger is involved; avoids risk of bodily harm; seeks to maximize personal safety.
Impulsivity	Tends to act on the "spur of the moment" and without deliberation; gives vent readily to feelings and wishes; speaks freely; may be volatile in emotional expression.
Nurturance	Gives sympathy and comfort; assists others whenever possible, interested in caring for children, the disabled, or the infirm; offers a "helping hand" to those in need; readily performs favors for others.
Order	Concerned with keeping personal effects and surroundings neat and organized; dislikes clutter, confusion, lack of organization; interested in developing methods for keeping materials methodically organized.
Play	Does many things "just for fun;" spends a good deal of time participating in games, sports, social activities, and other amusements; enjoys jokes and funny stories; maintains a light-hearted, easy-going attitude toward life.
Sentience	Notices smells, sounds, sights, tastes, and the way things feel; remembers these sensations and believes that they are an important part of life; is sensitive to many forms of experience; may maintain an essentially hedonistic or aesthetic view of life.
Social Recognition	Desires to be held in high esteem by acquaintances; concerned about reputation and what other people think of him; works for the approval and recognition of others.
Succorance	Frequently seeks the sympathy, protection, love, advice, and reassurance of other people; may feel insecure or helpless without such support; confides difficulties readily to a receptive person.
Understanding	Wants to understand many areas of knowledge; values synthesis of ideas, verifiable generalization, logical thought, particularly when directed at satisfying intellectual curiosity.
Desirability	Describes self in terms judged as desirable; consciously or unconsciously, accurately or inaccurately, presents favorable picture of self in responses to personality statements.
Infrequency	Responds in implausible or pseudo-random manner, possibly due to carelessness, poor comprehension, passive non-compliance, confusion, or gross deviation.

(Jackson, 1967, pp. 6,7)

Buros (1972) reports unusual care in formulation of items in order to conform to theoretically based trait definitions and to maintain a distinctness among traits and to reduce irrelevant variance.

Jackson (1967) reports Kuder-Richardson formula 20 estimate of reliability of .83, suggesting consistency in response to the highly diverse items. Kelly (1972) supports these findings and reports considerable stability of PRF scores over time; a median test-retest correlation of .81. Jackson (1967) states that each of the 22 scales has enough unique true variance to justify its use as a separate scale and to be potentially useful in predicting relevant external criteria. Wiggins (1972) considers the PRF among the most sophisticated personality inventories presently available. Crites (1969), also concluded that the PRF is well conceived and developed, and found its psychometric characteristics more than adequate. Reliability was found to be higher than those generally found in personality scales. Valentine (1969) confirmed high internal consistency and test, re-test reliability.

Written reports

The researcher obtained data from written reports whenever these were available. Much of this information had been gathered by the agencies granting the awards to the individuals in the sample. It represented a variety of sources such as: statements from participants (the intervener and/or the person rescued), statements from witnesses of the prosocial behavior, and police reports. Some of the content provided fresh data but much served as a valuable validity check on data collected in the interviews.

Newspaper articles were another source of information, as often the prosocial act had been reported immediately following the event.

Bias Potential in the Research Design

Bias is omnipresent in a study of this nature. As Leedy (1974) suggests:

> Bias for the researcher, like the presence of germs for the surgeon, is next to impossible to avoid. We must learn to live with it, but at the same time to guard against infective destruction. (p. 108)

The approach then in this study is to acknowledge that the data gathered are very sensitive to outside influences and highly susceptible to distortion. This acknowledgement is accompanied by a heightened awareness of possible sources of this bias. By carefully illuminating these sources of bias, rather than ignoring their existence, it is hoped that, "With this knowledge we may then appraise the research realistically and judge its merits honestly " (Leedy, 1974, p. 108). The researcher realizes that the choice of topic alone reflects certain of his biases, which remain present throughout the study. In gathering the data, the "truth" or hard facts are never as "hard" as supposed. In attempting to do a descriptive study the researcher is necessarily involved in one way or another, with the lives of the subjects.

As Cattel (1972) points out:

> For a method as fundamental as visiting with people, listening, speaking, and allowing conversations to proceed as they will, means that one's own life is implicated in the life of

> another person, and one's own feelings are evoked by the language, history, and accounts of this other person. (p. 16)

This type of researcher's involvement, and the tendency to identify and empathize with the subject has often been questioned as lack of objectivity. Herbert Blumer (1969) responds to this criticism by stating:

> To try to catch the interpretive process by remaining aloof as a so-called 'objective' observer and refusing to take the role of the acting unit is to risk the worst kind of subjectivism--the objective observer is likely to fill in the process of interpretation with his own surmises in place of catching the process as it occurs in the experience of the acting unit which uses it. (p. 86)

While acknowledging the researcher as a potential biasing factor, efforts were made in this study to control the possible detrimental effects of this influence. The decision to use a variety of sources of data to augment the observations gleaned from the interview situation, was an attempt to dilute the direct influence of the researcher's biases. The interviews were tape recorded to allow the researcher repeated opportunities to reflect on his questionning techniques and to maintain a record of data prior to its subjection to the researcher's interpretation. The researcher was conscious of the danger of the halo effect, of stereotyping and of surrounding people who have demonstrated prosocial behavior with a "rosy glow". The contradictory literature available describing people as "Angry Samaritans" (Huston, Geis & Wright, 1976) certainly helped to prevent the viewing of the subjects from a single perspective and influenced the researcher's choice of research methodology.

Although general areas of concern were established early in the research, the decision to avoid strict 'a priori' hypotheses limited the possibility of biases restricting the collection of data to that data which would support these hypotheses.

A second important potential source of bias in the study was from the individuals included in the sample. Bryan (1966) notes that qualitative methods, although enabling us to learn things about people that would not have been learned under other circumstances, also accentuates the fine line in the data between "truth" and "perspective". It may not be advisable, he suggests, to deal with truth 'per se', but rather to deal with truth from the subject's perspective; a perspective which is open to rationalization, interpretation, imagination, exaggeration and wishful thinking. The phrase "in the eye of the beholder" may truly suggest that people view things in different ways and Bogdon & Taylor (1975) make three observations relevant to qualitative research.

> 1. Not only do people interpret things differently, they focus their attention on different things. (p. 10)

For this reason the researcher supplemented the subject's accounts of his action with as many other views of the happening as possible. This information was available from a variety of sources; police reports, bystanders' statements, letters written by the person benefitting from the prosocial intervention, and doctors' statements. "Facts" of the situation could be substantiated and the other differences in perception and interpretation were precisely the aspects that most interested the researcher.

> 2. Just as different people may interpret the same thing differently, so too may the same person interpret things differently at different times. (Bogdon & Taylor, 1975, p. 10)

This has serious implications for this study. The researcher's searcher's observations were made after the prosocial behavior had taken place and the intervening time varied from six months to nearly three years. This variable could not be controlled, other than by the researcher remaining acutely aware of its possible impact and by reporting any observations that may be linked to, or affected by, it.

> 3. Your task, as a qualitative researcher, is to cut through common sense understanding of "truth" and "reality". (Bogdon & Taylor, 1975, p. 11)

As has been mentioned earlier, it is perceptions of the event which make up most of the data of this research, perceptions of the subjects, perceptions of the researcher, and perceptions of others involved to a lesser extent (persons who witnessed the prosocial behavior, or members of the committee which defined the behavior as worthy of an award). A composite picture of these perceptions is what defined the "reality" of the phenomena. As Leedy (1974) states:

> In research we cannot force the facts to support anything. The facts must speak for themselves, and if they are tainted with bias, that too we must accept as a condition to be minimized insofar as possible, and if it cannot be totally eradicated, to be faced as inevitable in most research, particularly in descriptive studies. (p. 108)

Nature and Establishment of the Sample

The sample for the study consists of individuals who have been presented with awards for intervention in a critical incident. The awards were made by two agencies; The Royal Canadian Humane Association and Life of Alberta. The researcher obtained the names from the files of the awarding agencies with permission and cooperation of the Honorary President.

Each of the individual subjects in the sample encountered a situation which demanded intervention on their part, and had the distressed person in a severe or potentially severe situation which demanded action on the part of the intervener, in order to spare the victim a worse fate, usually death. All of the subjects intervened on behalf of the victim at potential harm to themselves.

Names were submitted to the awarding agencies by individuals or groups. The "layman" defined the behavior as altruistic or prosocial and felt it deserving of recognition. A central selection committee of the agencies then made the decision whether or not to grant an award and the type of award merited.

The Life of Alberta, Life Saving Award, originated as a centennial project in 1967 and was presented each year until 1978. The criteria for award were the following:

Gold - extreme bravery and risk of own life in saving another. (Maximum of 3 awarded each year)

Silver - for bravery and presence of mind in the saving of the life of another. (Maximum of 6 awarded each year).

The Royal Canadian Humane Association awards the following:

Gold - usually awarded posthumously when one's life was lost while attempting to save another.

Silver - for extreme bravery and risk of own life while attempting to save another.

From 1977-79 there were seventeen awards given which fall into the above categories.

The sample of this study consists of ten of these individuals. For practical reasons the researcher did not attempt to contact subjects living outside the province of Alberta, (five individuals) and one individual could not be located. Of the eleven subjects contacted, one was reluctant to participate because of a pending lawsuit related to the incident.

All subjects in the sample were initially contacted by phone to determine their willingness to participate. Interview times were arranged at this time and permission obtained to tape the interviews. On completion of the personal interview the Personality Research Form was left with the individual, to be completed and returned to the researcher by mail. All the individuals interviewed returned the completed instrument.

The subjects represented various social class membership. All were adults, and Table 111 indicates the age distribution. The sample did not reflect a normal sex distribution. Of the ten subjects in the sample only one was female; in fact the potential sample population of seventeen, from which the subjects were drawn, contained only one female. Nine individuals were married. Nine

TABLE III

Age Distribution of Subjects

Age interval	Frequency
20 - 29	5
30 - 39	1
40 - 49	2
50 - 59	2

reported coming from families with no more than three children and seven of ten reported having children of their own.

The Situations

The ten subjects were witnesses to nine discrete emergency situations and intervened to assist another. To provide a context for the study, the setting and nature of each intervention is briefly outlined. It is a synthesis of the subjects' description of the situations, police, news, and witness reports.

Situation I

The subject had driven three friends to a river to snorkel and was going to pick them up after their swim further down the river. He had attempted to persuade his friends not to go over a weir. Apparently the three friends swam out to the barrels that are linked together with chains and hung on there for a while before going over the falls. The water going over the weir produced a strong undercurrent. The subject lost sight of all three for some time until one by one they came up further down the river. The subject went into the river which was described as very fast and treacherous and was able to get two of the three victims (one at a time) to the shore where he administered first aid. Only one of the three victims survived.

Situation II

The subject lived in an apartment suite when the fire alarm went off. The subject proceeded to bang on all the doors of the other apartments in order to alert the other tenants, then called the fire department and went outside. A two year old child was trapped in the burning apartment. There were numerous bystanders but none would go near the burning apartment. One witness kicked in the window but stepped back. The subject took a deep breath and crawled through the window into the smoke filled apartment, found the child and carried her to the window, to discover that other bystanders had moved back because of the heat and smoke. The subject, unassisted, then lifted the child out and proceeded to administer first aid until the fire department took over.

> ...I was good and mad...but I was too busy worrying about getting her out, and doing something medically to get her going. I realized that her time was not too long. It kind of scared me that maybe she was dead already...gave her mouth to mouth and instinctively started doing heart massage, just with my thumb and just gently...I watch emergency every day with my kids..but finally I got a kind of gurgle out of her ...the ambulance came...they wrapped her up in a fireman's jacket and they took her off. Then I just kind of wandered away. (Excerpt of subject's description)

Situation III

Two of the subjects came on the scene of a single car accident that had occurred minutes before their arrival. The car was on fire and the driver trapped inside. They directed another truck to go for help and proceeded to aid the driver in the burning car and a passenger who had been thrown clear. The fire was intense and the driver was on fire as well. Both subjects pulled the driver clear from the car.

> It sort of subconsciously registers that you have to do something...So we took off our jacket or shirt, whatever, and we held it up and shielded ourselves and we got close to the vehicle and we yelled at the guy. He

> was sort of semi-conscious. I think he understood us, because we could hear moaning, but he wasn't saying anything to us. We called 'Okay, are you free?' and he just moaned, so we said, 'Wiggle yourself free.' and we moved in and moved him out. (Excerpt of one subject's description)

Situation IV

The subject arrived on a bridge where many bystanders were looking over the railing at a woman below the bridge deck, who was apparently going to jump. The subject noticed that only one person was talking to the woman through the bridge deck and had his hand through the deck holding her. He designated several other bystanders to do certain tasks, one of them was to hold his legs and to lower him over the railing head first. Once he could see below the deck he then grabbed the woman and pulled her back up over the railing onto the bridge as his supporters pulled him up.

> We're going to bring you up over the edge. I can't remember the exact words, but I was kind to her, I wasn't mean to her. I got a little rough with her before she came up because she definitely wasn't coming up. She said she wasn't coming up and I said, 'You can't do anything down there. You could hurt yourself falling down.' I tried to reason with her, but I was upside down and you could feel the difference. I could feel my head getting heavy. Anyway I said, 'You've got to come up.' She said 'No I'm not.' She said 'You go back, because I don't want to pull you down too.' She was really concerned with me going in. And I said, 'No God damn way; you're coming up.' She kind of let loose a little bit and we got to the point where I could get underneath her arms. I got to a point where I could get a hold of her arm...I started pulling, and she started yelling that I was going to pull her arm off. I said, 'Well, you're going to have to let go or we're going to pull your arm off and bring part of you up here.' Well when I got her up a little bit higher, that's when she really bound in....I guess her legs were at that point where she could hang onto the wires and she wasn't coming then. So I got up under her arms, and I said, 'Well I've got a hold of you now.'

> There was no way she was getting away from me, unless they let me go. And she continued to protest. I called to the guys above, 'Okay fellows we're gonna come. We're gonna bring the top half of her up so start pulling.' Well Jesus Christ, they started pulling and she started coming, and then she started screaming that we were pulling her leg out or something, so I yelled at her 'Let go.' She said, 'I can't. You'll just have to back off.' By then we had her to a point where she couldn't undo. You know I really wasn't sure what she was going to do. I thought that it was just another trick and I wasn't backing off on her. They backed off on me and I backed off on her a little, and she did undo. She did that twice, so she got hung up one more time. As soon as I got her up to the bridge level the police were there and...(Excerpt from subject's description)

Situation V

The subject was part of a serious two car accident and suffered a broken collar bone but still managed to come to the aid of two people who were badly hurt in the other car.

> I was travelling by car to a conference...I had my wife and another couple with me; four of us in the car all together. I was driving. We had an accident. It was a single lane highway, there was a car, a Mustang, which pulled out to pass a truck coming towards us which put them right in our lane, so I swerved for the ditch, which fortunately wasn't a steep one. I think the slight angle was the thing that saved us from far more serious injury. I went into the ditch; I hurt my arm. My elbow went through the windshield, I hit my head, and the girls in the back hit their heads on the roof of the car and sustained mild concussion...The car was alright though. The other car, however, remained on the highway, spun around, it had broken its back, (the back of the car). The girl passenger was thrown out, she was not too badly injured. She looked bad as she had a bad gash in her head which was covered with blood. She had a very badly broken wrist. The driver, however, was extremely seriously injured. He was pinned under the wheel; his legs were broken, he had a broken collar bone, a fractured skull, blood clot on the kidneys--he was stuck and the gasoline was soaking his legs and there were sparks popping. The engine was very hot and the water was sizzling. When I saw him there, I knew he had to be hauled out. If the car would have ex-

> ploded he would just have been stuck, so I managed to haul him out. The car didn't explode as it happened but the potential was there. (Excerpt from subject's description)

Situation VI

The subject was holidaying on a beach when an older man got into difficulty swimming and was being carried out by a rip tide.

> Well, I think it was our first day on the beach, it was late in the afternoon and just about everybody had left. Two older men were swimming out further than they should have been. One came in and we thought they were together but then a lady up on the beach started hollering that her husband was in trouble and she wanted somebody to go out and get him. He was just floating there, and we said, 'He looks all right to us.' She said, 'He was a professional swimmer, and that he was in trouble.' I swam out and got him. He had been caught in a rip tide and couldn't get back in. He started to drown, but being a good swimmer, just floated hoping somebody would come out and get him. (Excerpt from subject's description)

Situation VII

The subject arrived on the scene of an overturned truck after several other cars had arrived but nobody was intervening. The trucker was trapped in the cab of the truck which was in the ditch.

> The trailer was on its side and the tractor was upside down, on the side of the highway. Several other cars stopped, but nobody was doing anything, so I moved my car a little bit out of reach in case it blew up or something. I guess subconsciously I was thinking, 'Either to do something or bugger off. One or the other. But whichever, do it now. If you think about it, it will be too late to do anything.' So I opted to do something. I parked the car and ran across, and he (victim) said, 'I don't know whether or not I can get out.' And I said, 'Well, let's give it a try.' I had to get his other arm out as well, to have both arms to sort of grab onto so that I might have a chance. He was about 230 pounds, a big guy. Something was breaking out into flames around the floor boards. I think it was diesel fuel; so I was trying to wrench my jacket off, and wrapped it around his arms so I could get a better hold. Because he was covered

> in diesel fuel and blood, at this point I could hardly grab hold of him. And I got him part way out, beyond the shoulders and his foot got caught down in the pedals. He told me to leave at that point. He said, 'It's not working and it is going to blow, so go and save yourself. Leave it.' I said, 'No, you're going to get out. I'll push you back a little bit and you get your foot free.' It was a struggle and a tussle and I would not normally have had the strength to get him out, but with the adrenalin pumping I was able to get him out. I lacerated his back, and managed to pull his pants off, while getting him out through the opening that scraped him. There were a few more flames around the fire wall, so I just rolled him down the ditch. It was about a ten foot elevation difference. (Excerpt from subject's description)

Situation VIII

The subject rescued an individual from a building which had been totally destroyed by an explosion. The building had collapsed and was on fire.

> ...Then I walked further away from where most of the people were, towards where the explosion had occurred, and looking at it carefully I saw some individual stand up in the middle of a bunch of debris, surrounded by fire and holding onto a pole. I didn't see him stand up, I saw him standing there, and I thought, 'Christ, there was an explosion and someone is still alive in there.' So I walked in to where he was, he was still standing there, and I put his arm over my shoulder and walked away from the area. (Excerpt from subject's description)

Situation IX

The subject saved three persons from drowning after a boat had capsized with the three in the boat.

> I was on the opposite side of the truck, I didn't exactly see the boat, which was about 250 to 300 feet from shore, tip over. My wife called out...I swam out to the first fellow, his head was underneath the water and he was sinking down. I grabbed him by the hair...and dragged him to shore...I proceeded to go for the second fellow...He was conscious but he could hardly swim...The third fellow was

> hanging onto the boat. The bottom was very muddy. Under the water you couldn't see a thing...(Excerpt from subject's description)

Research Questions

This research focused on some items in the literature which seemed to be most prevalent and in need of further clarification. The items were stated in the form of research questions as follows:

Item 1. Did the subjects feel there were cultural traditions or societal norms which prompt people to act prosocially?

Item 2. Did the subjects feel that their prosocial behavior was modelled on parental behavior or influenced by parental nurturance or discipline practices?

Item 3. Do the subjects that have demonstrated prosocial behavior share some specific personality traits or a common personality profile?

Item 4. What are the subject's level of moral reasoning as established by Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interviews?

Item 5. What was the subject's level of moral reasoning used in the real situation?

Item 6. Were there sequential steps which subjects followed as they proceeded to intervene?

Item 7. Was the prosocial behavior affected by the presence or behavior of other bystanders?

Item 8. Was the prosocial behavior affected by the considered expertise of the actor?

Item 9. Was the prosocial behavior affected by the characteristics of the person needing assistance?

Presentation of the Data

The data was collected from all the subjects and organized around the possible antecedents of prosocial behavior as reported in the review of the literature. The data was used to answer the research questions formulated, and to add to, judge, accept and discard various elements of the profile of the altruist that was currently available. As Leedy (1974) states "The mind of the researcher must do battle with the observed facts until the fact reveals its meaning with respect to the problem " (p. 109).

Guidelines for the Study

The obvious limitations of any study is the realization that much may be missed in pursuing the study, the following guidelines established by Rothney (1968, pp. 40, 41) were kept in mind:

- The 'importance' of the material gathered. No time was wasted gathering information outside of the purpose of the study.
- Concern with 'completeness'. An attempt was made to give as complete a picture of the researched area as possible, realizing that certain kinds of behavior may have been neglected.
- The third area was 'differentness'. The researcher has attempted to maintain an awareness of the uniqueness of the subjects. Although the prosocial behavior may have been similar (saving someone's life) the motivation, behavior and situation may have been different.

- Fourth is 'observability' of the behavior. Although much of what is reported here is in retrospect and gleaned from personal interviews, much can be substantiated from files and reports of the action reported just after the prosocial behavior.

Summary

This chapter has provided an overall view of the procedures which were followed in conducting this study. The following descriptions were included: the merits of the naturalistic study; the background, rationale and procedure for the interview strategy; other instruments used; the nature and establishment of the sample; a description of the situations or setting for the interventions; the research questions which provided the focus for the study; the outline for the presentation of the data; and the guidelines for the study.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter reports findings from the interview sessions and from the forms completed by the subjects. The interviews were a rich source of information and each represented the uniqueness of the subject's intervention. The attempt in this reporting and discussion of the data is to examine the responses of the ten subjects in the sample and to interpret the findings of this study in light of previous findings. The presentation of the data follows the format established for reporting on the related literature. Each of the research questions represents the inquiry into a variable suggested in the literature as affecting prosocial behavior. Each item is stated as a question and is followed by a detailing of the responses considered relevant to that dimension of the investigation. Quotations are used to illustrate the nature of the responses, maintain the personal perspective of individuals, and indicate the use and location of probing questions by the interviewer.

To preserve the anonymity of the participating subjects, subject A, B, C, etc. is used to designate individuals and this designation is randomized for each item - that is, there is no connection between subject A on one item and subject A on another item.

This chapter is an attempt to describe as precisely as possible what was observed about the group and about individuals within the group. Causal relationships or generalizations regarding the phenomena of altruistic behavior, represent a synthesis of the findings of the multi-dimensional inquiry.

Internal Variables

Item 1: Did the subjects feel that there were cultural traditions or societal norms which prompt people to act prosocially?

In our diverse and multicultural society is is difficult to identify specific cultural norms which permeate the society as a whole. There seems to be a wide range of behavior which is accepted and tolerated. The functional norms of our society seem ambiguous. When behavior is inconsistent with a traditionally accepted norm, laws are frequently passed in an attempt to bring the behavior in line with the expectations. In North America, there is a trend to use the legal structure to enforce prosocial behavior (Huston, Geis, & Wright, 1976). This would indicate that there is a growing concern for, and acknowledgement of, the discrepancy between the behavioral norm that is preferred, and the actual behavior being displayed.

The subjects in this study seem to confirm the lack of a predominant norm for prosocial behavior.

Q: Is it a duty of a person to help someone else?

Subject A) A: I think it is.

Q: Why?

A: I don't know, it is just the way I was brought up.

Subject B) A: It is the attitude of people, they do not want to get involved.

Q: Do you think it (not wanting to get involved) is common in our society?

A: Oh, quite common I am sure...

Subject C) A: No, I think it is entirely an individual reaction.

Q: So, would you hold it against someone who didn't act?

A: No, I would not.

Subject D) A: Maybe not expected - maybe I would want to change the world. I would want others to do it for me. If it ended up that that I couldn't do it then, I would want others to do it. My expectations are very low now because of that (incident), because I saw too many stand and watch instead of do...When it comes right down to it, I don't think anybody can watch somebody else literally die...Your conscience would not leave you alone the rest of your life.

Subject E) Q: Do you think that everyone should do what you did if they got into a situation like that?

A: Yes, I do. There are many people that don't do it though.

Subject F) Q: Did you say it was a responsibility to save someone else's life?

A: Well, you just don't let somebody die...you couldn't shoot anybody, and that's what it amounts to.

Subject G) Q: Do you think that everybody would be required to do what you did?

A: Oh, I don't think so.

Q: Why not?

A: Because a lot of people couldn't handle it. I think it would bother a lot of people mentally.

Subject H) Q: Why is it important to help somebody else?

A: Well, I don't know. I suppose as you go through life, you come to realize that man is a social animal. He has to live with his fellow men and you can live with them by being a bit of an isolationist...and not having anything to do with your fellow man. If you do that, maybe your thinking is more for your own preservation. But if you go through life and accept the social nature of man and become more of a social animal, then perhaps you realize that the protection of life - of someone else's life--has an equal importance to the protection of yours. Perhaps it is the exposure of this type of social living that gives someone the motivation or lack of thought of the consequences and which causes them to put their own life in some kind of danger to save another.

Subject 1) Q: Do you agree with the law in California which states that people should intervene on behalf of others?

A: That is not what the law says. The law just says, you will be punished if you don't. There is a big difference...No, I don't think that it is a valid law. I don't think assistance should be rendered under the threat of punishment if it isn't rendered ...but, even in saying that I would suggest that the assistance that is called for under the California law, is assistance to alleviate suffering at only inconvenience to others; like stopping at a car accident to cover someone with a blanket, to phone for an ambulance, perhaps to put someone in the back of the car and drive them to the nearest hospital. I think it is absolutely impossible to legislate authority which will punish a guy for not going into a burning car to get somebody out, or not risking his own life for another.

Subjects recognize the value of prosocial behavior in a society but are aware of and accept those whose actions do not reflect this valuing.

If the prosocial norm does not seem to predominate in our society on the whole, some subjects reflected on prevalent norms of their sub-cultures. Three out of the ten subjects perceived their rural background as having played a role in their early socialization. The following interview excerpts acknowledge the possible long term effects the expectations of their community may have had on them.

Subject A) Q: ...you mentioned a small town.

A: That had a lot to do with it, I would think.

Q: What were the effects?

A: First of all not taking off and helping. If you come from a small community you are always helping someone else. You are never saying, 'Well, to hell with you. You can do it your own way.' It is very cliquey in a small community. You are friends with everybody and you know everybody.

Subject B) Q: What does upbringing have to do with this whole thing?

A: It is what you know that has been put into you; what you picked up without knowing...I grew up in a small town and we were very close as kids. We lit our first cigarette together...We knew what was going on with everybody. There were no secrets.

Q: Always instant feedback?

A: Yes, and if you did something wrong, your friends would criticize you. In my mind I grew up more concerned about what my friends were going to say than what my parents were going to say, because that is the way it was.

Although the people in this study did act to help people in distress, they didn't feel that everyone in our society would or should help, and none thought that using legal means to encourage prosocial behavior was desirable. The norm of our society seems ambiguous enough that those who do display prosocial behavior, do not seem to do so because of overall societal expectations and display some degree of tolerance for those who did not act.

In order to account for variations of prosocial behavior within cultures or sub-cultures, the effect of the family as a socialization agent was examined.

Item 2 Did the subjects feel that their prosocial behavior was modelled on parental behavior or influenced by parental nurturance and/or discipline practices?

In our society there are many variables which may or may not play an influential role in children's development. All of the subjects in this study have been living away from their original family structure for many years. It would have been ideal to closely investigate the family actions and interactions as these subjects grew up as young children. This was impossible, so the researcher had to rely on the subjects' perceptions of the nature and importance of the family influence.

The difficulty in dealing simultaneously with the many dimensions of child rearing is obvious, and to isolate one aspect of socialization from the whole is almost impossible. In this study the subjects expressed a variety of opinions, ranging from confusion to certainty, as to the effect of parental nurturance or modelling. In the following responses the confusion or lack of specificity is evident even after interviewer probing.

Q: Did your parents have any influence on you?

Subject A) A: I guess it is just built into you. I don't know if it is heredity or just in your mind to help somebody when they are in trouble. I don't know why we do things when we do them. Maybe through the years my parents taught me somehow, but I don't understand it...Well, you know, we were a pretty close family and my mom and dad would take anyone in.

Subject B) A: Oh, I am sure to an average degree. Yes, the average amount of influence the parents have on an offspring, I had at least that much from my parents.

This lack of specificity typified all the subjects' initial responses to the questions. With further probing seven of the subjects were able to identify behavior or traits of their parents which they felt had influenced them. Two of the subjects identified a nurturing mother.

Q: Did your parents have any influence on your behavior?

Subject A) A: I think of the two, - my mother primarily, because most of my childhood – the times I can remember - my father was away.

Q: What can you remember about her? If you think about influence, what stands out?

A: Oh, I think a love, a gentleness and consideration.

Q: Do you apply them yourself?

A: ...I like to think that I am considerate of other people. Yes, I do.

Subject B) A: I think so. Yes, sure. I was brought up by my mother. She devoted a large part of her influence to try to make me what I am. She complimented me when I did take things coolly. She made me into an image of what she thought was good; what she thought she would like me to be.

Q: Are you pleased with that?

A: Yes, I think so. There is nothing I do not like. Basically, I am happy with myself.

Three other subjects perceived a more direct link with their parents' verbalizations and/or actions and their own prosocial behavior.

Q: Do you think your parents had any influence on your behavior?

Subject A) A: Well, my dad has told me he has pulled people off. My dad is an electrician, a linesman, he has told me about pulling people off poles that were badly burned. But I have never seen him do anything like that. He lives out in B.C. and I phoned him and told him that night (after the incident) what had happened. I had to talk to somebody (weeping) - so he said, 'Don't worry about it. You will try and forget it, but you will never forget it.'

Subject B) A: My parents are from European background and they are very strict. They wouldn't hurt anybody else, that sort of thing, and it was passed onto me in my upbringing...You kind of pass it on to your kids what you were brought up with, I wouldn't change that.

Subject C) A: I was born and raised on a farm. Things were a lot different when I was little. If there was ever a car stopped on the road, my dad always asked if he could help, even if it was just a tire...He never mentioned it once that I should be that way, but I do that now ...If I see another trucker on the road, I bet you 99 out of 100 times, I ask him if there is anything I can do.

Two of the subjects did not think that their behavior reflected their earlier family interaction.

Subject A) A: They (mother and father) let me pretty well go on my own. I was never close to my family. I was always the rebellious one, and if someone was in trouble it was usually me. My dad had a farm. I never helped him on it, I would always go and work for somebody else.

Q: Did your parents suggest that you should be helpful to people?

A: Not that I can recall.

Subject B) A: My father was domineering and a tyrant and I learned to be a tyrant too in order to deal with him...My parents made the whole world a bed of roses for me. I found out it wasn't like that at all. Those roses had a lot of thorns. In fact the many morals and things I have been brought up with have been destroyed since...My parents are not the type to get really involved without being returned in payment for it. 'I'll do it for you if you will do it for me' was the way they operated.

Although subject B did not feel that the prosocial behavior displayed was a result of family expectations or modelling, the subject had a desire to make family contact immediately after the incident.

A: ...I phoned my dad. My first reaction was that I wanted to hear my parents' voice....They asked me 'Why the hell I did it. Couldn't I stay out of trouble?'.

The intent of this study was not to examine in detail the effects of various socialization practices within the family, but rather to determine if the subjects perceived certain familial patterns or experiences as being directly related to their decision to intervene on behalf of another.

The literature (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977) strongly supports the idea that empathic and sympathic responding are in part necessary for prosocial behavior to occur and that they likely find their beginning in the family. The empathic reaction was certainly evident in the subjects and will be elaborated on later in the chapter, but the source of this empathy or the factors contributing to it could not be established or traced to the family background, in this study.

Along with the related literature in Chapter II, studies by Aronfreed & Paskal (1966); Midlarsky & Bryon (1967); Staub (1971) and Yarrow, Scott & Waxler (1973); report that the influence of nurturance and a meaningful, warm relationship built up over time, resulted in positive action on behalf of children. This study does not dispute that modelling and nurturance may encourage the long term behavioral disposition for prosocial behavior, but did find that it was not a necessary antecedent for the subjects studied.

Although there is great variety in the subjects' responses, all seem to accept the idea that parents had an influence, some more direct than others. It is difficult to translate this influence into an antecedent with a causal relationship to their behavior.

Item 3 Do the subjects, who have demonstrated prosocial behavior, share some specific personality traits or a common personality profile?

Data on the personality of the subjects was gathered in two ways. Firstly, the interview provided a source of the subjects' self-perceived traits and secondly, all of the subjects completed a personality research form and from this a personality profile was drawn for each individual.

The personality profiles from the Personality Research Form were examined to determine the subjects' scores relative to the test norms and to see if the scores clustered around any point on individual trait continua. Specific attention was paid to traits in which more than half of the subjects fell above, or below the norm. If there was an even distribution of the subjects about the norm, the item was considered to be neutral, that is, no group tendency was observed. In addition, it was noted how many subjects deviated by more than one standard deviation from the norm on the traits in which the subjects were not evenly distributed about the norm.

The P.R.F. identifies twenty personality traits which make up the personality profile. Table IV indicates the distribution of the subjects on the individual traits.

Jackson (1967) organized items through factor analysis and theoretical considerations into a number of superordinate categories. These categories are of specific interest to the study, and seem to identify certain personality dimensions that were common to the subjects in the

TABLE IV

Subject Distribution on Personality Trait Continua

	Low (L)		Norm			High (H)	
	2SD	1SD				1SD	2SD
Abasement		1	4		5		
Achievement			2		5	2	1
Affiliation		1	5		2	1	1
Aggression		2	4		2	2	
Autonomy			3	1	3		3
Change		3	2		3	2	
Cognitive Structure		1	3		3	3	
Defedence		3	3		2	2	
Dominance		1	1		5	3	
Endurance		1	1		2	6	
Exhibition	1	3	3		1	2	
Harmavoidance			1		6	3	
Impulsivity		3	2		2	3	
Nurturance		1	2		3	4	
Order		2	2		5	1	
Play	1	1	3		4	1	
Sentience		2	3	1	3	1	
Social Recognition	2	3	2	2	1		
Succorance		1	5		2	2	
Understanding	1	2	4		2	1	

sample. The following discussion will be organized around Jackson's categories, however, individual traits will be highlighted as they appear to contribute to the profile of this sample. In each category a line divides traits considered by Jackson (1967) to be opposing. The location of subject clusters in the trait continua was indicated by (L) when the cluster was below the norm, by (H) when the cluster was above the norm, and by (N) when it was about the norm.

Category A. Measures of impulse expression and control (Table V)

The group tendency in this category was to rank high in harm-avoidence, order and cognitive structure, and to be evenly distributed about the norm on the traits of impulsivity and change. This would suggest that the subjects would be better described as careful, cautious, organized, deliberate and precise; rather than impulsive, hasty, reckless or flighty.

The subjects' self-perceptions of their dominant traits supported the findings of the research form, as the following comments indicate.

Subject A) My method of doing things is to be methodical and to try to be logical....I tend to be cool in these situations, at least I appear that way to other people.

Subject B) You can't be spinny.

Subject C) I think I am more cautious...a lot of things my friends would do, I wouldn't do...maybe more logical, but I am not sure about that.

In this category the clustering at the high end of the harm-avoidance continuum is particularly noticeable (Table IV) with

TABLE V

Category A. Measures of Impulse Expression and Control

Traits	Cluster of Subjects
Impulsivity	N
Change	N
Harmavoidance	H
Order	H
Cognitive Structure	H

N = Norm

L = Low (Below the norm)

H = High (Above the norm)

nine out of ten subjects above the norm. Jackson's (1967) description of this cluster would then be:

> Does not enjoy exciting activities, especially if danger is involved; avoids risk of bodily harm; seeks to maximize personal safety. (p. 7)

This description would at first seem to describe the inactive bystander, rather than subjects of this sample who had distinguished themselves by intervening at considerable risk to themselves.

However, in light of Latane & Darley's (1970) research, the apparent contradiction is reduced. The progress through a sequence of decision-making steps reflects an approach which is orderly and attempts to reduce potential complications and danger.

The subjects' description of their mode of operation during the incident itself gives further support to the deliberate and controlled nature of their behavior.

Subject A) A: I knew I was faced with a situation...something I was always worried about, but hoped would never happen... I started to go out...I ran...then I said, 'Get a grip on yourself, go back and get your outside clothing on ...collect yourself' - and then I went back in and deliberately forced myself to take it logically.

Subject B). A: I didn't really know what to do right away. There was no way I was going up to the car, because I didn't know if the gas tank had exploded...and it would take me with it. So, we waited a split second and I saw that the tank had ruptured and all the gas had gone down the hill and ignited, so I knew it was okay.

Subject C) A: Yes, I thought about myself, but I also thought, 'I better get him out quick, otherwise it is going to explode and it is going to be too late...'.

Subject D) A: It depends to what extent you are going to think logically or consider the consequence of your actions. You know you could stand there and start with your family and end up wondering if you are go-

> ing to spoil your best shoes. By the time you get down to the point where you decide the things to consider, it would be too late. You know, I don't suppose for a minute that I thought it was going to blow up. I wasn't going to go in there with a thought that while I was in, it was going to pop. The thought that was in my mind was, 'I am going to get him out just before it pops'...now with that in mind you don't think about the consequences of what might happen if...I suppose it is the ultimate in positive thinking.

The result of the P.R.F., the subjects' self-perceptions and their personal account of their thoughts prior to intervening are all supportive of the idea that their behavior was controlled, rather than impulsive, and designed to minimize the personal risk involved.

Category B. Measures of Orientation Toward Work and Play (Table VI)

The group tendency in this category was to rank high in achievement and endurance, and to be evenly distributed about the norm on the play trait. This group tendency would suggest that the subjects would be better described as striving, purposeful, resourceful, persistent and persevering, rather than frivolous and carefree.

There was a noticeable clustering at the high end of the achievement scale, with 8 out of 10 of the subjects above the norm. Jackson's (1967) description of 80% of the sample would be:

> Aspires to accomplish difficult tasks; maintains high standards and is willing to work toward distant goals; responds positively to competition; willing to put forth effort to attain excellence. (p. 6)

All of the subjects, in their interviews, reported a desire to

TABLE VI

Category B. Measures of Orientation Toward Work and Play

Traits	Cluster of Subjects
Achievement	H
Endurance	H
Play	N

N = Norm

L = Low (Below the norm)

H = High (Above the norm)

do a good job, regardless of the task, and a desire to see things through to the end. It seems that the subjects, by taking on the task of helping another in distress, displayed behavior supportive of this trait.

There was a similar clustering at the high end of the endurance scale. The description of 80% of the sample would be:

> Willing to work long hours; doesn't give up quickly on a problem; persevering, even in the face of great difficulty; patient and unrelenting in his work habits. (Jackson, 1967, p. 6)

Other data obtained from the interview was supportive of the presence of this trait in individuals. Once deciding to intervene on behalf of another, they all persevered under extremely adverse conditions. The conditions under which some of the subjects risked intervening, were documented in police and witness reports as illustrated in the following Fire Chief's Report, compiled from witnesses' statements:

> A man went over and kicked out the window of the bedroom where the child was. The smoke was so dense and the heat so intense, that no one would go into the room and everyone moved away. (The subject) went over to the window and crawled into the room...the smoke was excessive...because of the heat and smoke, no one would go near the window to assist.

In another case the beneficiary reported:

> ...being trapped in his truck and covered with diesel fuel and blood. He had tried to discourage the helper, as he thought his own position to be hopeless. However, the helper refused to abandon him and persevered with his rescue attempt. The person to be rescued was considerably heavier in weight than the helper and reported having back lacerations proving that he was bigger than the hole he was pulled out of.

These two examples are illustrative of the unrelenting efforts displayed by all the subjects. They saw something that needed to be done, decided to do it and persevered until the intervention was completed.

Category C. Measures of Orientation towards Direction from Other People (Table VII)

The group tendency in this category was to rank low in succorance (6 out of 10 subjects were below the norm), and high in autonomy (7 out of 10 were above the norm). This group tendency would suggest that the subjects would be best described as free, self-reliant, independent, and autonomous, rather than looking for support or seeking help and being dependent on other reactions.

Jackson (1976) defined the autonomous individual as:

> Tries to break away from restraints, confinements or restrictions of any kind; enjoys being unattached, free, not tied to people, places or obligations; may be rebellious when faced with restraints. (p. 6)

The tendency for the low score on the succorance trait is supportive of the higher score on the opposing trait, autonomy.

All the subjects in this study reported making the decision to act independently of input from others. In one of the interventions, two persons in the sample acted together in the same rescue and were supportive of each other, but revealed the following in the interview:

> Q: If _ would have said, don't do it, don't go near it, what would you have done?
>
> A: I might have hesitated, but I think I would have made the same kind of effort.

TABLE VII

Category C. Measures of Orientation towards Direction from Other People

Traits	Cluster of Subjects
Succorance	L
Autonomy	H

N = Norm

L = Low (Below the norm)

H = High (Above the norm)

On further probing into this incident, it seems that each individual decided on their own to act and expected the other to arrive at a similar decision.

The other subjects in the study acted in the presence of neutral or opposing bystanders and did not appear to have been affected by their input or lack of it. This discussion will be expanded later in this chapter under situational factors (Item 7).

Category D. Measures of Intellectual and Aesthetic Orientations (Table VIII)

The group tendency in this category was to evenly distribute around the sentience norm and to rank low on the understanding trait. Seventy percent of the subjects could be described as not being particularly intellectually curious, reflective or theoretical.

This was supported in the interviews where subjects, on the whole, were not interested in analyzing their behavior. They reported great personal satisfaction regarding their prosocial actions, but were not interested in why they did what they did, and had given little thought to their motivation.

Category E. Measures of Degree of Ascendancy (Table IX)

The group tendency in this category was to rank high in dominance. This tendency would seem that the subjects could be defined as forceful, dominant, and assertive. The description of 80% of the sample would be:

TABLE VIII

Category D. Measures of Intellectual and Aesthetic Orientations

Traits	Cluster of Subjects
Understanding	L
Sentience	N

N = Norm

L = Low (Below the norm)

H = High (Above the norm)

TABLE IX

Category E. Measures of Degree of Ascendancy

Traits	Cluster of Subjects
Dominance	H
________________	___
Abasement	N

N = Norm

L = Low (Below the norm)

H = High (Above the norm)

> Attempts to control his enviornment, and to influence or direct other people; expresses opinions forcefully; enjoys the role of leader and may assume it spontaneously. (Jackson, 1967, p. 6)

During the interview, the subjects' self-perception of their qualities in this dimension of personality, support the research form results.

Subject A) A:...Yes I usually take charge more often than just going along.

Subject B) A:...I have always been able to stand there and say, 'To hell with you'.

Q: What do you think made you do it?

Subject C) A: I guess my dominance, I have always been a fighter, no matter what the odds were.

It is also supported by the take charge attitude displayed by the subjects during their intervention. After making the decision to intervene all of the subjects not only initiated action, but also directed others. This is evident in the following comments:

Subject A) ...as I jumped I said, 'Somebody stand by the window in case I don't make it out, at least you can get the baby if I can get the baby to the window'.

Subject B) ...She was down there and she wasn't coming up, so I said: 'We'll get her up'. It didn't take very long; it all happened very quickly.

The results of the P.R.F., the subjects' self-perceptions and their personal accounts of their behavior during the intervention, are all supportive of the idea that the subjects felt powerful and capable of taking control of a situation.

Category F. Measures of Degree and Quality of Interperson Orientation (Table X)

The group tendency in this category was to rank high in nurturance and low in affiliation, exhibition, social recognition, aggression and defedence. This was the only category in which the subjects' data did not support Jackson's division of traits into opposing scales within the category. The 70% of the subjects appearing at the high end of the nurturance continuum could be described as:

> Give sympathy and comfort; assists others whenever possible; interested in caring for children, the disabled, or the infirm; offers 'helping hand' to those in need; readily performs favors for others. (Jackson, 1967, p. 7)

The group would not be described as particularly affable, gregarious, nor easily angered, antagonistic, or defensive. Also of interest was the clustering at the low end of the continuum on the traits of exhibition and social recognition. Seventy percent of the subjects could be described as not wanting to be the centre of attention, and as not being ostentatious or exhibitionistic. Ninety percent of the subjects were on or below the norm of the social recognition trait, indicating that they are not seeking of recognition, approval, admiration, or desirous of credit.

The awarding agency reported difficulty in tracking down the subjects in the sample, in order to inform them of the award. The subjects, in the interview, reflected an ambivalent attitude toward being recognized for their actions. The following comments support the research findings which indicated that social recognition was not a dominant trait.

TABLE X

Category F. Measures of Degree and Quality of Interperson Orientation

Traits	Cluster of Subjects
Affiliation	L
Nurturance	H
Exhibition	L
Social Recognition	L
Aggression	L
Defendence	L

N = Norm

L = Low (Below the norm)

H = High (Above the norm)

Q: Were you pleased to get the award?

Subject A) A: Not really. I had been nominated for another award and had turned it down.

Subject B) A: No, even now I feel embarrassed about the award... when the subject of the reward first came up I thought they really shouldn't be holding that sort of thing...it is nice to get recognition, but I would have been satisfied if I hadn't.

Subject C) A: I didn't expect anything. When they (awarding agency) got hold of me, I was dubious as to whether I would even go to get it.

Subject D) A: No...if you want my opinion it is just a crock of 's'! I'm not knocking the people who put the awards on, or the people who asked me to accept the award. It is unimportant, you don't need a medal. People came over and asked me why I don't have it on the china cabinet...it is in the top drawer of my dresser, and that's where it is going to stay. I don't want people to know about it...I just don't like talking about it.

Subject E) A: I was scared to go to Edmonton. It was nice the way it was done, and nice to give people awards for stuff like that, but myself, I didn't think I deserved it.

Subject F) A: No, what bothered me about the medal, was that my satisfaction was a result of the person still being alive, that was good enough...I am tired of people saying I did a great job and me saying, 'Thank you'. It is simply, 'Just leave me alone'.

Subject G) Q: You mentioned that it was not important that other people understood your action in this incident, could you elaborate?

A: I don't think a general understanding of my actions and motivations would fulfill me anymore, would bolster my ego anymore, would give me a sense of satisfaction anymore, would give me more of a sense of pride. I know that a couple of organizations have recognized this and rewarded me, which I appreciate and consider an honor. The knowledge is there that they have recognized what I did, and that is nice. But as to the question whether it matters to me, whether everybody knows what my motivations were or

> understands my motivations, as was the question,- there is nothing there which gives me a self-satisfaction. That sounds a little deprecating; maybe I didn't put it quite right. You know, you feel good when a guy comes and pats you on the back and says, 'Gee, that was a great thing'. You know, you swell up a little bit. But to have some guy understand my emotions and feelings as to why I did it, that doesn't really seem to be significant.

All of the settings of the interventions were critical and adverse enough that the potential for failure or for looking ridiculous in trying unsuccessfully was very real. This didn't deter the subjects from intervening. It is clear from the subjects' comments and behavior that action was not motivated by potential attention, recognition or reward. Instead they provided assistance in an urgent situation, displaying empathy, role taking ability and other aspects of nurturance.

Table XI briefly summarizes the data collected on the personality of the subjects by means of the Personality Research Form and unstructured interviews. The subjects clustered above the norm on traits in Column "A", below the norm on traits in Column "C", and distributed evenly about the norm on traits in Column "B".

There has been some concrete evidence emanating from recent studies (Kohlberg, 1969) that the stage of moral development or moral reasoning and altruistic action are interrelated. This study attempted to compare the subjects' reasoning behind their-action in a real dilemma and their reasoning on a hypothetical dilemma. Data was gathered in structured interviews, Kohlberg's

TABLE XI

Group Trends on Personality Trait Continua

HIGH	NORM	LOW
A	B	C
Harmavoidance	Impulsivity	Succorance
Order	Change	Understanding
Cognitive Structure	Play	Affiliation
Achievement	Sentience	Exhibition
Endurance	Abasement	Social Recognition
Autonomy		Aggression
Dominance		Dependence
Nurturance		

N = Norm

L = Low (Below the norm)

H = High (Below the norm)

Protocols, and in unstructured interviews, in which the subjects were asked to reflect on their reasoning and make some value judgments in relation to their actions. Kohlberg (1968), in referring to his scheme of stage development, stated: "I have called this scheme a typology. This is because about 50% of most people's thinking will be at a single stage, regardless of the moral dilemma involved" (p. 28). For Kohlberg there exists a unitary predisposition to judge; in other words, there exists a direct link between the differentiated moral structure acquired and the ensuing judgment.

Item 4 What was the subject's level of moral reasoning as established by Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview?

All subjects were administered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview Form A (Appendix). All subjects were found to be at the conventional level of reasoning.

Within the conventional level, the Stage 111 reasoner gives precedence to shared interest over individual interests, while the Stage IV reasoner has a social perspective which upholds and maintains a social system with its roles and rules.

The following subjects' responses are illustrative of their reasoning:

Subject A) Q: Why should the Judge sentence Heinz?

A: To demonstrate to other people that Heinz had broken the law, even though the circumstances might indicate that that wasn't all that bad. But he had still broken the law, and we still must maintain a structure that our society can hang onto...in other words, even though our structure isn't perfect, it must be maintained and modified, to try and work out its imperfection. (Stage IV)

Subject B) Q: What is to be said for obeying the law?

A: There are times when the law, in detail, not in general, hurts people and if that is the case, then the law should be changed. But to ignore the law is encouraging a contempt for authority, which may have repercussions, which will far outweigh the simple disobeying of one law...I'm thinking about the fact that the whole structure of law by the majority would be broken down...(Stage IV)

Subject C) Q: Thinking in terms of society, what would be the best reasons for the judge, to give him a sentence?

A: The fact that the law says so. Society is built on those laws...We have to abide by the law which has been set by society. Stage IV -(III)

Subject D) Q: Should Heinz steal the drug?

A: Yes, because he was prepared to pay the druggist... for the sake of saving a life, and he had no other means of obtaining it, he should steal it. Stage III - (IV)

The above responses clearly illustrate conventional levels of reasoning. As has been stated earlier, at the conventional level, the self is identified with society and its rules, and individuals act for the betterment of society, or groups within a society. The subjects demonstrated by their responses that the preservation of life over property and life as a basic social right, was of importance to them.

Item 5 What was the level of moral reasoning used in the real situations?

When one considers interaction between reason and action, and finds them suitably related, then the structure within can be considered equilibrated. In other words, the moral structure adequately serves the person in his need for interpreting a situation and responding to it. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) suggest, "...adult moral stability appears to be more a matter of increased congruence between belief and social role" (p. 108).

Moral judgments are not made in a vacuum. The situational elements are a vital factor in each judgment. This is not to suggest that the judgment is determined by the situation. Judgment is the application and therefore adaptation of principle to situation.

All of the subjects in this study were consistent in reasoning at the conventional level, Stages III or IV. Their reasoning about their dilemma with which they were confronted, as well as their reasoning about further questions regarding the universality of their action, reflected their concern for the societal structure.

Subject A Well...I really couldn't live with myself if I didn't help...I guess I wouldn't want to be left the same way myself if I was in his predicament. Stage III -(IV)

Subject B ...If I did something wrong, my friends would criticize me. I grew up more concerned about what my friends were doing to say then what my parents were going to say...(Stage III)

Subject C It's an important thing (to help) because all life is... I can't see us existing for too much longer if we continue at the rate we are going (world situation)... everyone is your brother...I would want others to do it for me. (Stage IV)

Subject D I would expect a lot of people to do it. Yes, in the circumstances...most people have a feeling of consideration for their fellow man...I suppose as you go through life, you come to realize that man is a social animal. Perhaps it is the exposure to this type of social living that gives someone the motivation or lack of thought of the consequences which causes them to put their own life in some kind of danger to save another. Stage III-(IV)

Subject E Well, I would like to see everyone like that. I mean why shouldn't they be. Then we would know when something did happen to us that there was somebody behind that would help. Doesn't matter whether you are white, black, or green. Stage III - (IV)

Subject F I think the group of people in this (place) have been together for a long time...there is a good feeling... I think everyone would have done that for one of their fellows. (Stage III)

The examples indicate the subjects acted out of respect for life and the need for maintaining a social structure, and that they had concerns about the interaction between people. Although some responses give the impression of reciprocal reasoning (Stage II), it is clearly conventional, in that the well-being of society and the welfare of man is a basic consideration. All of the subjects' expressions indicate their role-taking ability and that they had developed a societal perspective. Their actions were not based on concrete reciprocity. They expressed a desire that others would show concern and come to the aid of others for the welfare of individuals and society. They repeatedly expressed the idea that their action was a result of how they perceived their role as a member of society.

All the subjects rejected the idea of passing a law in order to force others to display prosocial behavior, and felt that it was an individual decision. The value of life and the maintaining of that life was seen as a value or principle which society and the individual should uphold. Life was seen as of the highest value and its preservation considered crucial for the maintenance and structure of society.

In the hypothetical Kohlberg Dilemma all of the subjects felt that a drug should be stolen to not only save the life of the wife but also to save the life of a stranger. Similarly in real dilemmas the subjects' relationship with the beneficiaries played no part in their decision to act; they intervened to assist a stranger. In most cases the subjects had no idea who they were dealing with until they were well into their prosocial intervention. In both, the hypothetical and the real dilemma, the subjects expressed an obvious concern for the welfare of others and their society.

Altruistic action and the making of moral judgments involves an interaction of the following nature:

Cognitive Structure ←→ Process ←→ Definition of Situation (Dilemma)
(Role Taking, Empathy, Compassion)

In the model, the "process" is one area that seems critical to this study, as it mediates internal and situational antecedents of the intervention. Role taking plays an active part in constructing the meaning of any dilemma. Each subject in this study appeared capable of role taking and empathy and these factors acted as mediators in their decision to intervene.

The other factors, namely the defining of the situation, is of equal importance. Thomas (1931) alludes to this and the possible interaction of external and internal variables:

> Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior, there is always a stage of examination and deliberation, which we may call the definition of the situation. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life - policy and the personality of the individual himself, follow from a series of such definitions. (p. 41)

The subjects showed a consistency in their conventional moral reasoning on the hypothetical dilemma and their reasoning about the real situations encountered. They emphasized a concern for the social perspective and the value of life. Their role taking ability and empathic reaction was not only verbalized but translated into action, indicating a consistency in their reasoning and behavior.

Situational Variables

Several possible internal antecedents affecting the subjects in this study have already been examined and the extent of their influence on the sample discussed.

It is recognized that behavior "is a function of the integration between the person and the situation he or she encounters" (Mussen, Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, p. 139). The review of the literature identified several situational variables which have reportedly affected bystander intervention or the display of prosocial behavior.

The intent here is to examine the circumstances under which the subjects in this study acted and to assess the effect of the "setting" on their behavior.

Item 6 Were there sequential steps which subjects followed as they intervene?

Latane and Darley (1970) outlined an interlocking series of decisions: noticing the event; interpreting it as an emergency; considering what is to be done; deciding how to do it; and implementing the decision. The interviews were used to gather data on the self-perceived preactive cognitive activity of the subjects.

Noticing something wrong and interpreting it as an emergency

All subjects reported noticing something wrong and interpreting it as an emergency. Given the critical nature of each incident, supported by police, witnesses and news reports, it does not seem surprising that the subjects interpreted the situation as an emergency. The context was not ambiguous, and other individuals who came upon the scene also saw that something was wrong.

Q: What made you think there was a problem?

Subject A) A: You could see he (swimmer) was out too far...his wife told us he was in trouble...Somebody came running up from further down the beach and said, 'Who can swim here ?'.

Subject B) A: She (subject's wife) called out...'The boat has tipped...and one of them has not come up.'.

Subject C) A: ...she was crying and hysterical. I could see her older child, but not her two year old....I asked her where she was...She said something I couldn't understand. I grabbed her and asked her again....She said, 'She is in the crib and I can't get her out. I tried, and I can't.'.

Subject D) A: I heard the detonation. There was no doubt in my mind what it was and I knew I was faced with an explosion....As I walked further away from where most of the people were, towards where the explosion had occurred, and looking at it carefully, I saw some individual stand up in the middle of a bunch of debris and hold onto a pole. I didn't see him stand up, I saw him standing there, and I thought, 'Christ, there was an explosion and someone is still alive, standing there!'.

Subject E) A: The car passed us and was gone....We came around the corner and on the ridge of an embankment, the car was burning like crazy...We both went up the hill and could see the guy in the car was moving and he was on fire.

Subject F) A: The driver was pinned under the wheel and gasoline was soaking his legs and there were sparks popping and water sizzling.

Subject G) A: ...the truck had just stopped sliding upside down... you could see him (driver) in the crushed cab, there was diesel fuel running all over the ditch into the cab.

Subject H) A: I said 'What is happening?', and he (another bystander) said, 'Somebody wants to jump'.

The subjects obviously were not alone in noticing something wrong and interpreting it as an emergency, in fact the emergency was in some instances called to their attention by another.

Accepting the Responsibility to Act

The next step, accepting the responsibility to act, is where the subjects of this sample distinguished themselves from other bystanders. The subjects' responses indicate a bombardment of stimuli; there was a great deal to take in. Subjects initially reported "not thinking" but rather "acting out of instinct, reflex action or emotion".

Subject A) ...quickly I responded and went into the water, not thinking what she said or anything, I just knew that the boys were in trouble and needed help.

Subject B) No,...total instinct, I just jumped...I knew I had a baby in a crib....I put together baby and crib and I had to find a crib, so I just jumped.

Subject C: ...it all happened so fast, I don't think I had time to stop and think of anything....It is just something you do. You are there, it happens in a split second, and it is all over.

Subject D) ...it moved so fast. There were so many things happening in such a short period of time.

Subject E) ...It was the two of us (subject and beneficiary) together. I couldn't differentiate between what would happen to me if I did go in or didn't go in.

Subject F) ...I guess subconsciously I was thinking, 'Either do something or bugger off'.

Responses to further probing in the interviews indicated that despite the confusion, there was a critical point at which subjects decided to act. The intervention or decision to act was based on various reasons.

Subject A ...Nobody was going to act, so I told them to get out of my way.

Subject B ...I came on the scene and there were many people standing around, but no one was doing anything, so I told a couple of them to help me, and we went to work.

Subject C ...you know, he sort of got caught under the boat and started to drown. I didn't see him. So instantly I took off my clothes and went in.

Subject D ...I never thought about anything else...I just thought about getting him out and thinking of what I had to do at that time.

Subject E ...after assessing the situation I knew he had to be hauled out.

Subject F ...I was thinking....I was going to do something, one way or the other, but what ever it was there wasn't much time...It was soon going to be too late to run or to do something, so I opted to do something...and I went over and he was..

Empathy appears to have been a mediating factor between cognitive comprehension of the situation and altruistic action. Empathy usually consists of synthesizing the empathic distress and the mental representation of the other's general plight. The subjects indicated a highly sympathetic response to another's distress. They seemed to be able to process all levels of information. The subjects were able to generalize from their specific situation requiring action, to a more holistic and societal perspective. The empathy that subjects experienced served as one form of information about the other's state. This understanding of the other's state (being in distress) seemed to have given meaning to the subjects' responses.

Considering what's to be done and how to do it

The subject's cognitive processes during their invervention seemed to be focused on the immediate action needed and the process of intervention. Decisions were being made and problems solved under stressful and urgent conditions. The interviews show that the subjects attended to the task and appeared to be only partially aware of the activity on the periphery. The clarity with which the subjects perceived details of the incident and used this information in their decision-making was related specifically to the task. The subjects seemed to be able to do an instant mental search and bring to bear on this incident, relevant information from previous experiences. Subjects reported using information gained from television shows, cadet training, and fire fighting courses taken ten years previously.

Despite the subjects' comments "I didn't have time to think", the subjects' description during the interview indicated there was indeed a great deal of thinking going on. It seems that they did not have time to preplan the entire intervention, but instead, after deciding to intervene, developed their plan as they proceeded. Their actions reflect perception, reasoning and on-the-spot problem-solving. The following excerpt illustrates the critical cognitive processing of data:

> ...we came around the corner and saw a car burning like crazy on the embankment...we knew we had to do something...we stopped. I emphasized on my five year old son how important it was for him to stay in the car...told the next truck that came along to go to town and get help....We went up to the car, at first we couldn't see anything...then we saw someone on the ground...his head was laying down the embankment, he was gurgling...I turned him so his head was on the incline and tilted his head to the side so he wouldn't choke...all that happened in four seconds at the most...we saw the other guy in the vehicle and he was on fire...we looked at the fire...the first thing that came to mind was the possibility of the gas tank exploding...we could see a dark trail in the ditch...concluded that the gas tank had already ruptured...the flames were so high, something had to be fuelling them. It was so terribly hot. From a fire training session I had years ago, I learned that one should shield oneself...we had nothing else, so we held our shirts in front of our faces...we called for the guy to wiggle himself free, held out our shirts as a shield and moved in quickly. Crouched low...each grabbed one arm... he was so badly burned, I was pulling skin off his arm as I pulled...we pulled him away from the burning car...I didn't think I knew what I was going to do, but everything just seemed to fall into place.

This example captures the flavour of the cognitive processes behind the action. It is illustrative of the type of planning and thought sequencing also revealed in the other interviews.

The subjects' attention was so focused during the intervention, that all of them reported that they did not consider the possible ramifications to their own immediate family, should something have happened to them during the act.

Q: You thought nothing was going to happen to you?

Subject A) A: Not when I went. It didn't occur to me until hours later. It didn't occur to me to think that if I didn't get out, how my own children would manage.

Subject B) A: No, like I said, there was so little time...You just think about getting him out. Think about what you have to do at that time...I didn't think of my wife or anything else.

Subject C) A: It depends to what extent you are going to think logically or consider the consequences of your actions. You know you could stand there and start with your family and end up wondering if you were going to spoil your best shoes. By the time you get down to the point where you decide the things to consider, the car has probably exploded and the guy has gone up in smoke.

Subject D) A: You know, I don't suppose for a minute that I thought it was going to blow...I wasn't going to go in there with the thought that whilst I was in, it was going to pop. You see the thought that was in my mind was, 'I'm going to get him out just before it pops'. Now with that in mind, you don't think about the consequences of what might happen if it did explode while you were in. I suppose it's the ultimate in positive thinking.

Subject E) A: ...it just didn't seem important at the time. It wasn't a thing that you could take, weigh the consequences and then decide what to do. In the need for quick action, the impact of the car exploding suddenly became of minor importance compared to the actions I had to take in getting the guy out. They were pretty complicated--he was stuck and I had a broken arm.

The situations were so critical and so intense that the subject's attention was focussed on the reality of the situation, rather than on hypothetical or philosophical concerns. All of their energies and abilities were directed toward successfully intervening and the "what if" questions occurred to them hours, days or weeks after the intervention was complete.

Item 7 Was the prosocial behavior affected by the presence or the behavior of bystanders?

The literature reported that potential interventions were influenced by the presence and reaction of other bystanders, however, most of this research literature deals with "why people didn't act" rather than "why people did act." The interventions in this study were examined in order to determine whether the subjects made the critical decision to act when they were the only bystander or one of many.

Three of the subjects were the first to come onto the scene and to perceive the emergency. They accepted the responsibility to intervene before others were present. In each of these three cases, as other bystanders appeared, the subjects delegated tasks to them. Seven of the ten subjects were not alone when they decided to act. The reactions of the other bystanders in these situations varied from encouraging and helpful, to passive, to hostile and critical, as the following comments indicate:

Subject A) ...at first they said it was too dangerous, 'Just let him come in. (floating in rip-tide). He looks all right.'

Q: Who said that?

A: I can't remember, there was a whole bunch of people standing there. We were trying to ask the guy that was with him. We said 'Is he all right?'...The guy said, 'I don't know, I'm not with him.'...Well, we had thought they were swimming together. There was a lot of confusion.

Q: What made you decide to go?

A: ...His wife was there. She said that he was in trouble as he was a good swimmer. Well, I mean, nobody else volunteered to go.

Subject B) Q: Were there other people there that could have come to help?

A: Oh yes, there must have been thirty to forty people around. My wife called for a rope and nobody produced a rope. I knew, there must have been rope available, but they (bystanders) didn't seem to realize how serious it was. Somebody hollered, 'Let the S.O.B.s drown.'...Everybody just seemed to go on fishing...perhaps oblivious to the whole thing... Some people came over a half an hour later and asked 'What happened to those guys? Did they drown or were they alright?'...They didn't even concern themselves to come over and see what was happening at the time...They just didn't want to have anything to do with it...They didn't seem to want to get involved.

Subject C) A: ...There were thirty to forty people standing around. When I went over to the window, five people were standing there, and there was this big fellow who kicked in the window just as I got there. All I remember of him is his big boots, and as soon as the smoke poured out of the window, he said, 'I can't go in there, I might pass out.' The girl standing beside him had a long nightie on and said she couldn't manoeuvre in it if she went in. Another fellow said, 'Wait for the fire department.'... So I said, 'Get out of my ---- way' and jumped in.... But when I got back to the window, the people that were standing there had all moved back to the crowd. There was no one standing there at the window to help me. They had all moved away....They all saw me go in and heard me, but they all moved back. I was good and mad. I was really upset, but I was too busy worrying about getting her out...

It would appear from witnesses and the subjects' own accounts of their behavior, in relation to the behavior of other bystanders, that the subjects acted autonomously. They seemed not to process input (whether it was encouraging or discouraging) from other bystanders and relied on their own perceptions of the critical nature of the situation and independently accepted the responsibility to act.

The subjects' actions did, however, seem to have a positive effect on other bystanders. Once the subjects began their intervention, their behavior and their specific requests prompted other bystanders to assist. In two of the situations the bystanders continued to remain inactive, either unaware or deciding to ignore the subject's directions.

Item 8 Was the prosocial behavior affected by the considered expertise of the actor?

Information gained from the interviews was examined to see if the subjects' decision to intervene was a result of self-perceived expertise. Their assessment of the potential cost of the intervention to themselves would be affected by how competent they perceived themselves to be. The subjects all reported feeling confident they could intervene successfully prior to acting. The subjects were, however, aware of the dangers of intervention, and helped in ways that lessened chances of injury to themselves.

The consideration of the potential cost of intervention, which may have acted as a suppressant of helping behavior, seems to have been overruled by the positive way the subjects dealt with the cognitive and affective dimensions of the dilemma. They seemed to be confident that they had the ability to carry out the necessary intervention and none of the subjects perceived themselves as concerned with failure, or its implications. The source of this confidence appears to be a synthesis of qualities and abilities, rather than competence in a specialized skill. In only one of the incidents examined, was the subject's decision to act affected by his confidence that his skill level in a specific competency (swimming) required to carry out the intervention, was superior to other bystanders. Even though the subject perceived himself to be the most competent of the bystanders, he wasn't sure that his competency was sufficient.

Subject A) Q: Are you a good swimmer?

A: Yes, I am O.K.

Q: ....you knew you could pull him in?

A: Oh yes,...I'm a pretty good swimmer, so I guess I knew I could handle it.

Q: When you were swimming out, what was going through your mind?

A: Nothing, I was just wondering if I could get out that far.

Q: Oh, so you were worried about getting out?

A: Yes, well I knew he was in rip-tide. I had seen someone drown before in Mexico in a rip-tide, so I knew what it was all about.

In the other incidents, specialized training or possession of a distinct skill which could assure success in the intervention, wasn't an enabling competency or a variable in the subject's decision to intervene. None of the other nine subjects could be considered trained for the action they displayed. The skill required to enact the intervention was not singular, nor easily identifiable. The following comments indicate the subjects' decisions to act were not made because of a felt competence in a specific skill, but rather a felt competence in their ability to carry out the intervention.

Subject A) Q: So you were quite confident that you could go out there, and didn't feel that you were risking anything?

A: No, not at the time, I was just there to help. I didn't realize the circumstances until the next day, when we sat down and started to talk about what really happened and started to compare stories (with his wife). I don't recall too much, because my mind was set on saving the person and getting them back to safety as quickly as possible.

Subject B) Q: When you were running into the water did you have a plan?

A: Well, I had some first aid in the fire department in Ontario....I guess it just comes to your mind at a split second that this is the way you do it,...It didn't enter my mind to be frightened. I was never scared at any time....If you don't know what you are doing, you should stay away from it.

Subject C) Q: Why could you not tell someone else...stronger or bigger than you to do that?

A: I was mad, very mad, he must have been about 6 feet 3 inches and weighed about two hundred pounds and I figured if he won't do it, then I am going to do it. Whenever I have done anything, I never stop and think, 'I can't do it.', I just go ahead and do it.

Subject D) Q: ...You have never had any experience with this type of incident?

A: No, but I've had about fifteen or twenty years of experience, thinking about such fires...you might say that I was prepared.

Subject E) Q: So you knew all the right things to do?

A: ...Well, no, I've had no training....I guess it was just common sense....Whatever I did I gathered from T.V., reading, first aid books or somebody else telling me....I had thought years before what I would do if I would come across something like this.

Subject F) A: ...She was not hurt to the extent where moving her would cause a problem, and I know a little bit about first aid.

Subject G) A: Well...I suspect that I was feeling...in the back of my mind...that I would be able to do it....My self esteem was enhanced by being able to do something for somebody else.

Subject H) A: Yes, I wasn't super excited....I was able to say things to him like, 'Never mind trying to send me away. Get your foot loose, and I'll get you out.' ...Possibly I was half convincing myself at the same time.

Subject I) Q: What made you think you could get him?

A: ...I don't know, I just had a feeling.

From the above examples it becomes clear that a feeling of confidence in their ability, on the part of the subjects, played an important part in their decision to act. Despite the adverse conditions facing them they reflected on previous experiences, whether real or vicarious, to aid them in determining the nature of their prosocial actions. The data indicated that individuals had previously acquired a great deal of information, by various means, and were capable of reconstructing this knowledge to aid them in planning appropriate intervention. Furthermore, the examples reflect each person's unique social learning history and experiences; they reflect the interaction of the products of cognitive development and social learning with the specifics of the immediate situation in which the behavior was generated. The subjects' reasoning and action in the intervention was influenced by previous experiences. The dilemma found a context in the subjects' cognitive and affective structure and in turn this structure was able to accommodate the dilemma.

Item 9 Was the prosocial behavior affected by the characteristics of the person needing assistance?

The recipients of the prosocial behavior had one thing in common, they all required assistance to prevent further injury and possible death. It is this characteristic, their legitimate need for help, that the subjects appear to have responded to. In only one incident was a person needing help well known to the intervener. In all other instances, little or nothing was known about the recipient. The subjects perceived a life in danger, and that perception took precedent over other attributes of the potential beneficiary. Age, sex, attractiveness, or personality traits of the potential beneficiary did not play a role in the subjects' decisions to intervene, as the recipients included children and adults, males and females, and information on other traits such as age, race, and attractiveness, were not available to the subject--prior to intervention, nor did they seek this information. The empathy that was apparently aroused in the subjects was for a fellow human being in difficulty.

The literature suggests, and one would expect, that individuals needing help because of forces beyond their control, would elicit more altruism than an internally caused dependency. In this study, where individuals needing assistance had in some way contributed to their dilemma (carelessness, drinking, attempted suicide), the bystanders did tend to be passive or even hostile. It does not appear, however, to have been a factor affecting the subjects of this study. The subjects didn't hesitate to intervene. They dealt with the distress, rather than the characteristics of the inividual needing help, regardless of whether the distress was internally (brought on by self), or externally (forces beyond recipient's control) caused. Diagram I represents a sequential process bystanders may have experienced. The bystanders clearly heard, saw, or were made aware of, the incident. The event was public; otherwise people would not have gathered at the site. Bystanders may or may not have perceived it as an emergency or that someone required immediate assistance. The interpretation was private. It is clear that the subjects in the study, interpreted the situation as critical; it did not seem at all ambiguous to them, nor did they look to others to confirm their interpretation. Again privately, and apparently oblivious to bystander input, they acquired the responsibility to act and made the decision to intervene. The only characteristic of the recipient that they focused on was the victim's need for assistance. The potential cost of the intervention was offset by the subjects' confidence they would be successful. As one subject commented, "I just knew I would get him out and then it would 'pop'".

As Diagram I indicates, the interpretation of the situation and the acceptance of and responsibility to act remained private, and therefore the subjects had several opportunities not to act. It was not until they initiated the intervention that they moved into the public domain. In seven of the interventions, other bystanders did not act until the subjects of the study instructed them to assist. Since the inactive bystanders were not available to this research, it is not known at which step the process outlined was

FIGURE I

Process of Bystanders Experience


1
2
Event or Dilemma (public)
Effect On or Interpretation by Bystanders (private)
4
3
Taking Action (public)
Acceptance of Responsibility to Act (private)

interrupted. It is possible that at Step 2 they interpreted the dilemma differently than the subjects, but it seems more likely that they were unable or unwilling to accept the responsibility of intervention (Step 3). Their reasons for not intervening would be as interesting an investigation as the reasons for intervention of the subjects of this study. The subjects of this study completed the process outlined, accepted the responsibility to act, and initiated the intervention. The findings in this chapter indicate the relative influence and interaction of many of the possible internal and external antecedents of their behavior.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This chapter summarizes the investigation. The areas explored in this research are outlined and their relationship to findings in the literature are clarified. Conclusions are drawn, the limitations of the study are described, and implications are presented along with recommendations for further research.

Summary Discussion

The need

As has been discussed in the related literature, most of the research regarding altruistic or prosocial behavior has tended to use simulated or experimentally designed situations. The result has been a profile of the Good Samaritan drawn under conditions which require substantiation from naturalistic studies. Such was the attempt in this study.

The design and methodology

The sample for this study consisted of ten individuals, who intervened at considerable personal risk in order to save the life of another. The interventions took place under a wide spectrum of emergency situations. Three subjects were involved in a water rescue; four subjects were involved in rescuing persons from a burning vehicle after an accident; two were involved getting a person out of a building which had exploded or was on fire and one subject prevented a person's fall from a bridge.

This study explored altruism in a naturalistic setting and used a descriptive survey method to investigate the problem. Data was gathered by structured and unstructured interviews with the subjects and the administration of the Personality Research Form (Jackson, 1967). Interviews were of about two hours duration and were conducted in the subjects' homes after an appointment had been made by telephone. The researcher found the subjects extremely cooperative, open and candid about their experiences, even though the reconstruction of their intervention aroused strong feelings and sometimes painful recollections. The subjects were interested in the implications of the study and, although several had refused to have any contact with the news media, they did volunteer to participate once the intent of the study was made clear. The Personality Research Forms (PRF) took about one hour to complete. The PRFs were left with the subjects at the completion of the interview to be filled out and returned by mail to the researcher. There was one hundred percent return rate.

The presentation of the data was organized around items formulated in order to substantiate, reject and add to the items suggested in the literature as affecting displays of prosocial behavior.

Limitations

It should be noted that the conclusions must be treated with caution, since the evidence on which they are based is subject to the following major limitations. The small sample does not allow for broad generalizations. The situations in which the subjects participated were beyond the control of the researcher. The data was gathered some time after the events had occurred, and subject to the limitation of the interview technique which has been described at greater length in Chapter III.

Findings related to internal variables

Potential antecedents considered in this domain were demographic variables, cultural and sub-cultural norms, family socialization practices and long term modelling effects, personality traits, and level of moral development.

The literature generally considered demographic attributes of subjects as incidental correlates of altruism which suggest complex and difficult to interpret relationships. Because of the small size of the sample the demographic variables were not a prime focus for this study. The subjects were all adults from various social classes but only one subject was female. It would appear from this study that individuals requiring assistance in high risk situations are more apt to be helped by a man than a woman. The reasons for this are unclear and although one could speculate on socialization practices, societal expectations, or respective mobility, it remains speculative and beyond the scope of this study.

The literature provides evidence that cultural membership affects individuals perspectives, beliefs, values and behavior.

The subjects in this study found the prosocial norms of their society ambiguous. They were not, however, in favor of bolstering the existance of a norm through legislation. As a group, they reported being more affected by sub-cultural norms, and make specific mention of rural background and family influences. All of the subjects reported being influenced by their family, however it was not necessarily a direct form of influence as reported in the literature (i.e. nurturing family or presence of a model) that led to their prosocial behavior. Nurturing or modelling was not a necessary antecedent for the behavior examined in this study, although it appears to have encouraged the predisposition for prosocial behavior in many of the subjects. The subjects perceived that parents had influenced their development but what specifically was done, or how this was done, was not clear or uniform. The findings from this study would support generally the idea that the predisposition for prosocial behavior is influenced by family interactions, however none of the subjects mentioned family members or expectations when discussing their motivation for helping in their particular intervention.

The relationship between personality characteristics and prosocial behavior was fragile and tentative in the literature. Trait studies in the literature generally found that altruists were assertive, adventurous, outgoing, risk takers and expressive individuals who were well adjusted, responsible and persevering. The findings of this study indicated a clustering of the subjects on certain personality trait continua. The subjects were not impulsive or risk takers. These findings are in contradiction with the findings of previous studies and would generate the hypothesis that those who come to the aid of another do so in a methodical and deliberate manner which minimizes the risk to themselves. The subjects in this study clustered above the norm in the achievement and endurance trait continua which supports the findings in the literature. The clustering above the norm on the autonomy trait continuum reflects a self reliance and independence on the part of the subjects. This trait was reflected in their decision to accept the responsibility to act regardless of other bystanders' presence or input. The fact that subjects ranked high in the dominance trait seems to be a logical extension of their ranking on harm-avoidance and autonomy. The dominance trait as defined by Jackson (1967), involves being forceful, assertive and being in control of situations. Subjects asserted themselves in situations requiring prosocial action and delegated certain responsibility to others. The tasks assigned to others were designed to assist those in distress as well as to reduce the risk to the subjects. However, even in situations where bystanders did not assist or act, the subjects showed their independence by carrying through their prosocial action unassisted. In their interpersonal orientations the subjects were nurturant, but were not inclined to exhibition or looking for social recognition. The subjects were desirous of helping another, but for reasons other than being in the limelight or being externally rewarded for their actions. The significance of the personality profile is not the profile in isolation, but rather its interaction with the other antecedents of prosocial behavior.

One of the criticisms of moral development stage theory is that the level of moral reasoning may or may not be coincidental with moral action. This study demonstrated that the reasoning displayed on a hypothetical dilemma was generalizable to a real situation. The subjects' reasoning emphasized role-taking, and a generalized social system perspective, both of which characterize the conventional reasoner. The subjects defined social responsibility in broad terms. Conventional reasoning, according to Kohlberg (1969), typifies most of the adult population in our society so one could risk the assumption that many of the inactive bystanders had the same level of reasoning as the interveners. If we wish to encourage prosocial behavior of this nature it is encouraging to note that interveners do not have to be post-conventional reasoners. Conventional reasoners appear to intervene or not intervene as a result of the interaction of a number of possible variables. This underlines the importance of examining a combination of traits as they relate to intervention rather than examining them one at a time. The interaction of the various internal determinants is evident and complex.

Findings related to situational variables

Potential antecedents considered in this domain were the subjects' decision-making processes, the effects of the presence and behavior of bystanders, the considered experience of the subjects, and the characteristics of the person needing assistance.

In the research there is general agreement that individuals who intervene on behalf of another, follow a sequence of steps in their decision-making. The subjects of this study support Latane and Darley's (1970) interlocking series of decisions. Although the subjects' initial responses in the interviews did not reveal this series, responses to further probing indicated a critical path of decision-making similar to that described in the literature. The emergencies were not ambiguous and the persons legitimate need for help aroused an empathy in the subjects. This empathy involved a synthesis of cognitive and affective components. The subjects were able to discriminate and label the states of others, assume the perspective and role of the other and share in the emotion being witnessed. This study supports a major tenet (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977) that empathy, compassion, and role taking are critical antecedents to prosocial action. The question of how aroused compassion is translated into action is not, however, answered, in the literature. In this study, the response that subjects gave to the question "Why you?" indicated an interaction between moral reasoning and personality factors. Subjects often mentioned the value of life, that life was a basic right in society, and stated that people should care for others. Furthermore they expressed the importance of interpersonal relationships within a societal context and that integrity and commitment between people was necessary for the benefit and survival of society. The subjects conceived of inaction, in situations requiring assistance, as similar to actively doing harm to another. Measurement of moral judgments focus on what an individual thinks or believes he should do. The enaction of these moral choices involved a high level of self-control and depend upon the subject's ability to regulate his own behavior in the face of adverse conditions and without the presence of an external reward. Personality factors facilitated the translation of the individual's judgment about what he should do and his personal competencies - what he could do - into behavior congruent with his moral ideals.

The literature strongly contends that a victim is more assured of having someone come to his rescue if the bystander is alone and that the behavior of other bystanders, if they are present, influences whether or not help will be given. Many of the studies in this area were experimentally designed and dealt with ambiguous emergencies. The literature, however, also reports that bystander"apathy"is less likely to occur when the need for assistance is obvious.

This study found that the subjects acted autonomously, whether they were alone or with a number of witnesses when they made the decision to intervene. As an individual, they independently accepted the responsibility to act, and did not diffuse this responsibility amongst the group of bystanders. Even if they asked for assistance and did not receive it they remained task oriented, and persevered in their intervention. The presence of a model (the subjects who intervened) seemed to affect the other bystanders. In all but two cases the bystanders responded and assisted the interveners. In one of the instances where bystanders remained inactive, a critical antecedent (according to subject and witness reports) aroused negative feelings about the victims. These had developed over a period of time prior to the emergency situation. The emergency was perceived as having been brought on by the victims and therefore, as the literature suggests, elicited less empathy than an externally caused emergency. This was the only situation in which characteristics of a person needing assistance seemed to be an influential antecedent, but even in this instance it did not influence the action of the subjects of this study. The subjects generally knew little or nothing about the individuals needing assistance, and those beneficiary characteristics that they could perceive on the spot, other than the legitimate need for help, were not criteria used in the subjects' decision to intervene. Contrary to the findings reported in the literature, characteristics of the beneficiary were not an influential variable with the subjects in this study.

A further item investigated was the considered self-expertise of the intervener. The literature reports bystanders hesitancy to act may result from their anticipation that other bystanders may be more competent. Although the subjects in this study were not trained to meet the emergencies they encountered, they perceived themselves to be competent and were confident that they could intervene successfully. They reported perceiving the dangers involved and initiated an intervention which minimized, as much as possible, the risk to themselves and maximized their chances for success. Subjects reported that they would not have acted if they had felt that the task was beyond them. This appears to be a critical antecedent to the subjects' intervention, and would lead to the hypothesis that those who feel a sense of power over their environment and competent to intervene are likely to come to the aid of another.

Concluding Comments

In our society, people generally may not feel obliged to provide assistance in a severe situation. Although man's concern for his fellow man has consistently permeated his verbal doctrines, his actions are not always complementary.

The subjects of this study reported that, although they intervened, they did not expect that everyone would do so or had a duty to intervene under similar circumstances. They did, however, consider their intervention as contributing to the general welfare of the society as well as benefitting the victim. The term "prosocial" used by the researcher in describing the subjects' actions was an integral part of the subjects' motivation and perceptions of their own behavior. The subjects' decision to intervene was affected by their assumption that:

a) the planned intervention could be carried out with minimal risk to themselves since they did not see themselves as risk takers.

b) they were capable of intervening successfully.

c) by means of "on going" planning they could successfully complete the task; by taking it a step at a time, things would fall into place.

d) by using all of the resources available to them, they would be able to dominate or control the situation.

This study maintained a holistic perspective in order to identify antecedents of prosocial behavior and to observe and record interactions between the antecedent variables. The findings of the study underline the speculation in the literature that behavior as complex as altruistic behavior involves an interaction of variables. These "interactive affects" are critical in the subjects' decision-making process for prosocial action. Witnessing an individual in distress aroused in the subjects feelings of empathy and compassion and resulted in an interaction between cognitive and affective components. Empathy and compassion were motivating factors, however, in isolation, they were insufficient to ensure action. It was the interaction with other variables which translated the desire to assist and to help into prosocial behavior.

The antecedents of prosocial behavior discovered in this study are summarized in Diagram II. The summary profile of the Good Samaritan, was a composite of the following: the subjects

FIGURE II

Interaction of Antecedents of Prosocial Behavior


Decision Making
Noticing something wrong and perceiving it as an emergency
Cultural and Sub-cultural Norms
Family Socialization Practices
Personality Traits
Harmavoidance
Order
Cognitive Structure
Achievement
Endurance
Autonomy
Dominance
Nurturance
Level of Moral Reasoning
Conventional reasoners
Stage 3 or stage 4
Predisposition to act Altruistically
Situational Variables
Accepting the responsibility to act
Planning and enacting the intervention
Internal Antecedents
External Antecedents

brought with them to the situation personality traits of harm avoidance, order, achievement, endurance, autonomy, dominance, nurturance and a sense of confidence; and conventional moral reasoning including an ability to role take and empathise with a focus on the societal perspective and an individuals right to live. Personality traits and level of moral reasoning were related to the cultural mileau and early socialization practices. These were the qualities which affected the individuals predisposition to act, but describing characteristics of the individuals accentuates how little is known about exactly where, when, or how these characteristics were developed.

Because of the interaction of internal variables and motivational factors, the subjects felt a capability to initiate and offer assistance. If the subjects had felt a great deal of compassion but lacked the necessary personality traits (i.e. dominance and endurance), they could well have been inactive bystanders. The subjects followed a sequence of decision-making steps in their intervention. They noticed something wrong and interpreted it as an emergency. There was a critical point at which they accepted the responsibility to act and in so doing were more influenced by internal than external antecedents. Perhaps if the predisposition to act altruistically was weaker, then the situational variables would have had a greater impact. It is beyond the scope of this study, but one could speculate that the inactive bystanders may have shared similar motivations. Perhaps the interaction between the affective and cognitive dimensions may have been different. It may be that certain linkages are formed in the mind as the individual faces new and unfamiliar situations but not everyone is able to form these linkages and organize a process which enables them to act in a new and hitherto unfamiliar manner.

In deciding what form of intervention their action should take, subjects were intent on relieving the victims' distress and converting their moral judgments into moral conduct. In deciding how to enact the intervention, the subjects were confident that they could competently handle the emergency and acted in a methodical manner which minimized the potential risk to themselves.

The combination of antecedents that profile the Good Samaritan in this study may not be the only combination that result in prosocial action. Mischel and Mischel (1976) support this view:

> The extremely complex relations among diverse aspects of prosocial behavior within the same person, and the specific interactions between human conduct and the psychological conditions in which it occurs, prevent global generalizations about the overall nature and causes of - moral and immoral - action (p. 107).

The opportunity does not often present itself for interventions such as were described in this study, but the role played by internal characteristics has implications for socialization agencies and practices. Education, both in the school and in the home, needs to place greater emphasis on encouraging in children a concern for others, feelings of competence, higher levels of moral reasoning which encompasses role taking ability, empathy, compassion, and a positive regard for humanity, to ensure the dignity, freedom and rights of mankind. The challenge is there to develop in children, qualities which will predispose them to behave prosocially. There seems to be little evidence to indicate that our childrearing practices give a high priority to the inculcation of altruistic concern for others. If the educational system reflects the desires of its society then the emphasis on skill development at the expense of developing the disposition to use the skills wisely, can only result in greater egocentric behavior.

Research into prosocial behavior has been slow to develop, but the more recent interest in carrying out investigations with a wide range of foci and methodology is encouraging. Reliable and creative research into prosocial behavior may not always result in satisfactory findings, but the potential social significance of better understanding the phenomena should not be underestimated.

Suggestions for Further Research

Although this study has contributed a profile of a small sample of Good Samaritans it has also identified areas which need further investigation, questions to be answered and hypotheses to be tested.

Much more needs to be known about parental influence, modelling and nurturance, and how prosocial behavior is influenced by the family and other socialization agencies. Longitudinal studies of child rearing practices and their effects are also needed.

This study found the subjects to be conventional reasoners and it attempted to relate their reasoning to their prosocial behavior. The questions remain: Is it sufficient to be a conventional reasoner? Is it more important to consider the primary focus within conventional reasoning? Do all the individuals who act prosocially regardless of their level of reasoning choose to address the same issues in their reasoning about the act? Will higher levels of moral reasoning lead to more predictable action? What is the level of moral reasoning and issues focused on by those who stand by and don't accept the responsibility to act?

Although there has been a great deal of speculation, and some investigation, into why some individuals act and others don't, there is still a need for further research into the influence of internal and situational antecedents. What antecedents are significantly related to inaction?

Naturalistic studies are difficult and complex because of the number of variables beyond the control of the researcher, however, results from simulations are more difficult to generalize. Intensive and indepth multidimensional studies of individuals who demonstrate prosocial behavior or individuals who "stand and watch" may provide some insights as to the working of antecedent variables. This study has shown that the cognitive and affective processes are not separate, but continually interacting within the individual. More needs to be known about the nature of this interaction and the interaction of other simultaneously functioning antecedents.

One of psychology's mandates is to contribute to the betterment of mankind. Research into altruism and prosocial behavior provides such a contribution. The opportunity presents itself for developmental and social psychologists to conduct research and to present information in order for society to deal with its concerns about its vulnerability and competence in encouraging prosocial action and to identify the potential social effects of action or inaction.

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APPENDIX

MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW (FORM A)

HEINZ

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why?

2. What's to be said for obeying the law in this situation or in general?

Harvard Centre for Moral Development, November 1974.

HEINZ (cont'd)

3. In this situation law and life come into conflict. How can you resolve the conflict taking the best arguments for both into account?

4. If the husband doesn't love his wife is he obligated to steal the drug for her? Why or why not?

5. Why is it so important to save the woman's life? Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as for his wife? Why?

HEINZ (cont'd)

6. Heinz steals the drug and is caught. Should the judge sentence him or should he let him go free? Why?

7. Thinking in terms of society, what would be the best reasons for the judge to give him some sentence?

8. Thinking in terms of society, what would be the best reasons for the judge to not give him some sentence?

JOE

Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?

2. Can you give me the best reasons to support the other point of view?

JOE (cont'd)

3. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself an important consideration here? Why or why not?

4. Why should a promise be kept?

5. What makes a person feel bad when a promise is broken?

JOE (cont'd)

6. Why is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well or are not close to?

7. Trust is one important thing in a good father-son relationship. What are some other important considerations that a good father should recognize in his relations with his son? Why are they important?

8. How is a good parent-child relationship similar to any good human relationship? Why is that?